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ABSTRACT 
Using evidence from a sample of over 800 leases, this paper examines the productivity of farming in 
the Paris Basin between 1450 and 1789. Existing evidence about productivity is unreliable, the paper
argues, and the leases provide historians with a new and valuable source for the study of productivity 
and economic growth. Much of the paper is devoted to a defense of the method employed with the 
leases, which point to spurts of spectacular growth on local farms but also to stunning setbacks during 
times of war and increased taxation. The paper concludes with analysis of the causes of economic 
growth in pre-industrial agriculture. 
Like many religious institutions in early modern France, the Cathedral of Notre Dame in Paris 
owned a staggering amount of agricultural property--in particular, scores of farms and parcels of land 
scattered throughout the Paris Basin. The cathedral's papers, housed today in the National Archives, 
describe these holdings, record the sometimes poignant details of their management, and preserve the 
new leases that tenants agreed to, typically every nine years. As one might expect, the documents 
concerning Notre Dame's possessions are voluminous. The index alone, compiled by an obsessive 
archivist in the eighteenth century, comprises thirty manuscript volumes, and for property after 
property, one encounters strings of leases running from the late Middle Ages up to the end of the 
eighteenth century. 
Such agricultural leases have been employed with profit by a number of enterprising 
historians. 1 Yet most scholars have been content to use them to study landlords' revenues or to assess 
the burden placed upon the peasantry. A few researchers, it is true, have attempted to derive an 
index of agricultural output from series of leases, but they have always done so apologetically, since 
the documents seemed a poor substitute for the records of the tithe. 
What historians have not realized, though, is that leases can shed considerable light on 
agricultural productivity. Under the proper conditions, evidence from leases can be combined with 
product prices and with the costs of the factors of production to give us a measure of productivity. 
The measure of productivity here is not merely the partial productivity of land or of labor, but total 
factor productivity, the ratio of outputs to inputs that takes into account all the factors of production 
used in farming--land, labor, and capital. Agriculture leases have previously been employed in this 
way to study the productivity of early modern English agriculture, and although their use may at first 
seem a picaresque adventure in pseudo-statistics, they ultimately furnish us with evidence that is 
firmer than the shaky figures we have for crop yields and output per worker. And it is evidence of 
considerable importance, for it reveals whether agriculture was in fact shackled by organizational and 
technological rigidities, as so many historians believe, or whether, even under the Old Regime, certain 
farms could extract more output from the same amount of land, labor, and capital and thereby 
chieve econo111ic growt . 
What follows is an analysis of 808 leases gathered from the archives of the Cathedral of Notre 
Dame de Paris from the period 1 450- 1 789. The leases form 39 series, each one concerning a separate 
property in one of 25 different villages scattered throughout the Paris basin (Figure I). The
properties in question lay on average a little less than 40 kilometers from Paris, with the closest only 
5 kilometers from the city center and the furthest 96 kilometers away. Most were rented along with 
only minor rights to collect the local tithe or local seigniorial dues, and none changed significantly 
in size, for if the size did change appreciably, I began another series of leases for what I considered
a different holding. As a whole, the properties ranged from a minuscule plot measuring only 0.26 
hectare (roughly two-thirds of an acre) to an enormous farm of 278 hectares, or roughly 700 acres, 
and they averaged 67 hectares. As one might expect, they were devoted overwhelmingly to grain 
1 For the Paris region alone, one can count a number of excellent studies using leases: Beatrice 
Veyrassat-Herren and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, "La rente fonciere autour de Paris au XVIIe 
siecle," Annales E.S.C. 23( 1 968): 54 1 - 55; Jean-Paul Desaive, "A la recherche d'un indicateur de la 
conjoncture: Baux de Notre-Dame de Paris et de l'abbaye de Montmartre," in Les fluctuations du 
produit de la dime: Conjoncture decimale et domaniale de la fin du moyen age au XVIIIe siecle, ed. 
Joseph Goy and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie (Paris, 1 972), pp. 44-57; Gilles Postel-Vinay, La rente 
fonciere dans le capitalisme agricole (Paris, 1 974); Jean Jacquart, "La rente fonciere, indice 
conjoncturel?," Revue historigue 5 14( 1 975):355-76; and the contributions by G. Beaur and J. M. 
Constant in Prestations paysannes: Dimes. rente fonciere et mouvement de la production agricole a 
l'epogue preindustrielle, ed. Joseph Goy and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, 2 vols. (Paris, 1 982). 
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production: only l .4 percent of the land was vineyard and only 4.8 percent natural meadow.2 
The sample is not random--few of the properties lie west of Paris--but it does seem 
representative of open-field agriculture near the city. It also lets us track a large number of identical 
properties over long periods of time, something previous researchers have never accomplished. The 
sample has another advantage as well: we know each property's characteristics--the area, the location, 
the nature of the crops, the identity of the tenant, and so on. We can therefore relate variations in 
agricultural productivity to these characteristics and do so more precisely than ever before. In the 
end, the sample paints a somewhat startling picture of an agriculture capable of spurts of considerable 
growth, at least in the charmed environs of Paris, and it helps us discern, more precisely than in the 
past, the causes of growth and stagnation under the Old Regime. 
l .  Land rents 
The first step toward assessing productivity--and one that is interesting in its own right--is 
to survey the trend of nominal land rents. Table 1 presents rent averages from the sample for each 
decade from 1 450 to 1 789.3 Most other authors limit themselves to simple averages, but since rent 
depended on land quality and location, I have also adjusted the averages for variations in quality as 
properties jump in and out of the sample. Columns 2 and 4 display the results of the adjustment, 
which uses a regression of ln(rent) on property characteristics and other variables affecting rent.4 
The net adjustment is relatively minor and does not affect the overall trend in land rent. 
Other methods of correcting for quality differences have an equally small effect. So too does 
averaging the rent in a different way: weighting all the leases in force in each year by area, under the 
assumption that each lease remained valid for nine years or until renewed (Table l ,  column 3). The 
difference with the second method is that it weights leases by area and counts not only leases signed 
in a given year but all those from previous years that remain binding. 
The only discrepancy between the two methods appears when crises strike or when rents are 
2 The sources include the index to the actes capitulaires de la cathedrale de Paris in AN LL 3 19-
350/3 5 1  and the original leases, property descriptions, and land management records in AN S l23-462. 
J. P. Desaive was first to use AN LL 3 1 9-350/51 as a source for leases; I have gone over this index 
myself and I have also consulted all of the corresponding original documents in AN S l23-462. All 
averages here are calculated counting each lease separately; weighting each property by its area would 
not change the results appreciably. 
3 For a detailed account of how I treated in-kind payments, pots-de-vin, contre-lettres, rent 
understatement, charges, and a host of related problems, see appendix 1 .  Cf. Jacquart, "La rente 
fonciere," and Gerard Beaur, Le marche foncier a la veille de la Revolution (Paris, 1984), pp. 23 1 -46. 
4 The relevant property characteristics included soil quality; presence of natural meadow and 
vineyard, since meadow was scarce and vineyards entailed capital investment; surface area, since large 
properties typically rented for less; and distance from Paris, which measured the costs of 
transportation to the major market in the region. Ideally, one would want to have in the regressions 
a measure of the cost of shipping crops to Paris by the cheapest means available--overland for 
properties close to Paris, and by river for more distant properties, where the economies of river 
transport overtook the added costs of shipping crops to a river port and then loading them on boats. 
For our properties, however, the shipping costs, as is shown in appendix 2, were nearly perfectly 
correlated with simple distance. The quality-adjustment regression also included dummy variables 
for the devastating war years of the League and its immediate aftermath; for the late eighteenth 
century, when rents seemed to rise; for repeat tenants, since historians believe they depressed the rent; 
and a time trend to capture the effects of infiation and changing prices. See Table 1 and appendix 
3 for details. 
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Table 1 - NOMINAL RENT (LIVRES/HECTARE) AND AGRICULTURAL PRICE-COST INDEX 
Leases Nominal Rent Ln(Rent) Price-Cost Index 
Decade in Sample ( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1450-59 2 0.70 0.76 0.57 -0.29 
1460-69 3 0.72 0.80 0.67 -0.23 
1470-79 3 0.73 0.94 0.62 -0.07 
1480-89 4 0.68 0.69 0.79 -0.69 
1490-99 5 0.94 0.97 0.81 -0.07 
1500-09 4 1.23 1.33 0.98 0.28 
1510-19 6 1.74 1. 76 1.40 0.50 
1520-29 11 2.14 2.24 1.82 0.57 0.62 
1530-39 14 3.01 2.96 2.23 0.79 0.69 
1540-49 13 3.66 4.12 3.11 1.36 0.72 
1550-59 20 5.07 5.15 4.72 1.58 0.74 
1560-69 13 6.55 7.34 5.86 1.92 0.77 
1570-79 23 9.09 8.74 7.28 1.99 0.86 
1580-89 24 12.43 10.98 10.40 2.27 0.81 
1590-99 26 12.02 12.86 11.92 2.13 1.14 
1600-09 31 12.81 11.64 10.53 2.21 0.95 
1610-19 35 10.85 11.05 8.96 2.25 0.87 
1020=2 38 13.54 13.16 11.61 2.35 0.96 
1630-39 38 20.78 20.26 15.79 2.84 1.19 
1640-49 32 20.91 20.54 17.40 2.83 1.05 
1650-59 27 23.07 22.28 19.14 2.84 1.22 
1660-69 33 26.42 26.53 19.55 3.11 1.13 
1670-79 25 18.78 17.92 17.12 2.79 0.95 
1680-89 24 19.92 19.75 15.88 2.86 1.04 
1690-99 26 21.27 21.58 17.49 2.96 1.10 
1700-09 35 25.44 23.97 20.83 3.06 1.06 
1710-19 31 23.79 23.54 19.12 3.06 1.12 
1720-29 30 30.34 27.81 20.55 3.24 1.07 
1730-39 32 25.01 23.35 22.17 3.10 1.09 
1740-49 32 25.73 25.29 19.03 3.17 1.16 
1750-59 29 27.41 27.14 21.20 3.25 1.12 
1760-69 27 31.90 28.95 23.75 3.32 1.12 
1770-79 19 43.74 43.07 32.44 3.73 1.32 
1780-89 30 49.46 47.91 38.40 3.83 1.16 
1 Average rent for the leases in the sample 
2 Average of quality-adjusted rent for the leases in the sample 
3 Area-weighted average of quality-adjusted rent for all leases in force 
4 Average of quality-adjusted ln( rent) for the leases in the sample 
5 Agricultural price-cost index (mean = 1).
Note: The quality adjustments rely upon regression 1 in Table 2 and begin by correcting 
In( rent) lease by lease. Column 4 is the decennial average of
where a1 through a5 are the coefficients of percent meadow, percent vineyard, good soil,
In( distance to Paris), and In( area) in Table 2, regression 1, and x1 through x5 are the corre­
sponding variables measured as deviations from their means. The variable z is quality-adjusted
ln(rent); since the quality adjustment is linear, we would get the same answer if we first averaged 
In( rent) over each decade and then applied the quality adjustment. Column 2 is the decennial 
average of e' for each lease; because exponentiation is not linear, column 2 will not be precisely
the same as what we would get by exponentiating the values in column 4. Column 3 averages 
the area-weighted rent for all the leases in force; it involves the same quality adjustment, except 
that x1 through Xs are now measured as area-weighted averages. Column 5 is f, the ratio of
agricultural prices to the costs of the factors of production other than land, where each price 
and each cost is weighted by its share in total revenue. Shares are from the Bernonville farm. 
See appendices 1, 3, 6, and 9 for detruls. 
Source: Sample of leases; other sources listed in appendix 14. 
growing. During crises, averaging over all the leases in force exaggerates somewhat the rent that was 
actually paid, while during rent inflation, it lags behind the true value of the land. The difference 
may of course seem small, but it can disturb the calculation of productivity, which requires an up­
to-date figure for rent--ideally, what land would fetch if leased to the highest bidder. Given the 
slight problems with averaging over all the leases in force, we will therefore eschew it in favor of the 
average over the leases in the sample--that is, the leases signed in any year. In other words, we will 
prefer columns 2 and 4 in Table 1 to column 3 .5 
Our rental series, it turns out, matches the evidence unearthed by other historians. If we plot 
the numbers in Table 1, column 2 versus the figures for the outskirts of Paris published by Beatrice
Veyrassat-Herren and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, we get startling agreement (Figure 2). The same 
chorus of agreement rings out if we compare our evidence with other series from the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.6 While the similarity perhaps detracts from the novelty of our numbers, it 
lends credence to what they say, and in particular to what they reveal about productivity. 
2. Using leases and prices to measure productivity
Today we easily measure the productivity of agricultural labor by dividing the quantities of 
goods produced by the number of agricultural workers. Performing a similar computation for the Old 
Regime, however, is a hopeless undertaking, and while it has been attempted, the results seem 
dubious. The problem is determining the size of the agricultural labor force, a calculation that, even 
when done with nineteenth-century census records, is fraught with difficulty. How does one know 
what fraction of the rural population worked in farming when many denizens of the countryside 
toiled in cottage industry?7 
It is equally difficult to trace the evolution of the productivity of land. To be sure, we can 
derive grain yields from a variety of documents, and the yields measure the productivity of land used 
in grain farming. The problem is that the French evidence is always scanty, making comparisons of 
------�y'"i"'e"'ld..,s�ouv�e1r+tim..nre-.rtreacherotts-ttneler�ffi-eut17�tare varieG-G�lly from year'-t<:l�---­
year and from one end of a farm to another, casting doubt on any comparison between, say, a 
sixteenth-century yield taken from a probate description of a particular field and a nineteenth-
century yield calculated from a census average for the surrounding arrondissement. Worse, even 
seemingly reliable averages can be deceiving. If wheat supplants crops of lesser value (such as rye) 
on poorer soil, then average yields for wheat can stagnate or decline, even though the value of output 
5 For a discussion, see appendix 3.  
6 Veyrassat-Herren and Le Roy Ladurie, "La rente fonciere." Since Veyrassat-Herren and Ladurie 
deflated their rent series, I multiplied their figures by the moving average wheat price that they used 
for deflation. Other ways of comparing the two series led to similar results. See appendix 4 for 
details. For other local rent figures that parallel ours, see Beaur, Marche foncier, pp. 262-68; Jean 
Jacquart, La crise rurale en Ile-de-France. 1 550- 1 670 (Paris, 1 974), pp. 6 1 6, 638, 699; and M. 
Bertrandy-Lacabane, Bretigny-sur-Orge, Maro lies-en-Hurepoix. Saint-Michel-sur-Orge(Versailles, 
1 886), pp, 3 1 4- 1 5. 
7 Postel-Vinay, "A la recherche de la revolution economique dans !es campagnes ( 1 789- 1 8 1 5)," 
Revue economique 40(1989): 1029- 1 033; J. P. Bompard, Thierry Magnac, and Gilles Postel-Vinay, 
t!Emploi, mobilite et cho111age en France au XIXe si€c1e: �v1igraticns saisonnieres entre industrie et
agriculture," Annales· E.S.C. 45( 1990): 55-76. 
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Figure 2: Nominal Rent Indices for Sample and for Ladurie Leases 
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per hectare and physical yields themselves (on soil of a given quality) are rising.8 
If following grain yields over the centuries seems intractable, one might hope (as many 
historians have) that the tithe could be used to track land productivity, provided that it was levied 
on fields of a fixed size. One serious but largely unacknowledged problem, though, is that the tithe 
series historians rely upon are likely to omit output from innovations such as artificial meadows and 
from new crops such as turnips. The large ecclesiastical institutions whose tithe series historians favor 
often lost their tithe rights when land was planted with new crops. A flat graph of the tithe derived 
from such records could easily mask growing productivity and thus gravely mislead us.9 
One therefore cannot easily compute labor productivity or extend yields and other measures 
of land productivity back into the past. And none of these figures give us total factor productivity: 
even when reliable they furnish only partial productivities of land or of labor and usually only for 
a single crop, such as wheat. What of agricultural capital and the other factors of production? And 
what of the farm products that the tithe series skip, such as wool or meat, which were far from 
negligible even in grain growing regions? What we need of course is a new source of information, 
preferably one that lets us measure not just the productivity of one output or of one factor, but total 
factor productivity. 
That is what the leases allow us to do. When combined with prices and wages, the rental 
values in the leases yield a measure of total factor productivity that, while itself open to objections, 
seems much more reliable than the dubious physical measures of output per worker or even output 
per hectare. Using prices and rental figures in this way was first suggested by Donald McCloskey, 
in an analysis of English enclosures. More recently, Robert Allen has successfully employed the same 
method to examine the productivity of enclosures and of English agriculture in general in the early 
modern period. 10 
What McCloskey and Allen rely upon is the fact that total factor productivity (TFP) can be 
calculated with prices and rents in place of the actual physical measurements of the products and 
factors of production. The definition of TFP here is a standard one. It gauges the effectiveness of 
------��ion an<i-is-4w.ined--rm1ghly speaking--as the average product of all the inputs to
farming. Its rate of change equals the speed at which farm production is growing less the rate at 
which use of the factors of production is increasing, with each product weighted by its share in total 
revenue and each factor by its share in total cost. In mathematical terms, the rate of growth of TFP 
is 
8 For difficulties with comparisons of yields, see Jean Meuvret, Le probleme des subsistances a 
l'epoque Louis XIV, 3 vols. (Paris, 1 976-88), vol. 1 ,  pt. 1 (Texte): 207-2 1 1 .  For one well known 
attempt to compare yields, see Michel Marineau, Les faux-semblants d'un demarrage economique: 
Agriculture et demographie en France au XVIIIe siecle (Paris, 197 1 ) .  
9 In 1603, for example, the canons of Notre Dame went to court because they were unable to 
collect the tithe on land recently put into cultivation and sown with turnips in the village of Louvres. 
In 1 7 1 3 - 1 6  they lost the tithe on new artificial meadows in the village of Dampmart to the local cure. 
In these examples, the sort of tithe records historians use--records of large ecclesiastical institutions 
such as Notre Dame--might even show a decline in the tithe at a time of agricultural improvements 
because (as was often the case) the tithe rights to new crops belonged to the cure. See AN LL 327-28, 
fols. 12- 1 7; LL 3 3 1 ,  fols. 2 1 0-50. 
10 Donald McCloskey, "The Economics of Enclosure: A Market Analysis," in European Peasants 
and Their Markets, ed. William N. Parker and Eric L. Jones (Princeton, 1 975), pp. 1 23-76; Robert 
Allen, 11The Efficiency and Distributional Consequences of Eighteenth-Century Enclosures,11 
Economic Journal 92(1982): 937-53. 
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( 1 )  
Here the Y;'s are the outputs produced; the P;S and u;'s are the corresponding output prices and output 
shares in total revenue; the x/s, the factors of production used; the w/s and v/s, the corresponding
factor prices and factor shares in total cost; and dots refer to growth rates. The expression on the left 
is simply the definition of TFP measured in terms of physical units of inputs and outputs; under 
conditions we will specify below, it will equal the expression on the right, which is measured in terms 
of prices. 
If we also assume, as Allen does, that the product and factor shares remain constant over time 
(an assumption that turns out to be very reasonable for early modern agriculture), then we can 
integrate (I) to get a formula for TFP:
., •. 
TFP = 
W1 ··W,. (r+I)' C = ., "· p P1 ··Pm 
(2) 
Here r is per-hectare nominal rent, t is per-hectare taxes, s is the factor share of land, C is a 
geometric index of the costs of the other factors of production weighted by their factor shares, and 
P is a geometric index of the price of agricultural products weighted by their shares in total revenue. 
We have made the reasonable assumption that the burden of taxation falls on land, so that the cost of 
land equals rent plus taxes, or (r + t). In non-mathematical terms, TFP is high if a property manages 
to support high rent and taxes despite high costs for the other factors of production and low product 
prices. 11 
To calculate TFP, it thus suffices to know product and factor shares, the prices of agricultural 
products, and the cost of the various factors of production, including land. We can measure TFP 
-------eeci><thM>er,,_as-a-weigllted raHe-ef-ootpuW:fuantlties-µroduced divided by factor quan1iti<:S_u�t_i�li-z�ed���o�r�----­
equivalently, as a weighted ratio of factor costs divided by product prices. The point is that more 
efficient techniques and organization not only increase physical outputs for a given level of inputs: 
they also depress product prices relative to factor costs and ultimately show up in the form of higher 
profits and rents, once we correct for the variation in prices and wages via the indexes P and C. If 
a clever farmer discovers how to increase his productivity--perhaps he manages to squeeze more 
wheat from the same plot of land, the same amount of capital, and the same amount of toil--then he 
will reap higher profits as well, profits that will eventually fund higher rent payments to his landlord. 
If others imitate him, the price of wheat may fall, but TFP, which is a weighted ratio of factor costs 
divided by product prices, still increases. On the other hand, a mere shift in rents, wages, and prices 
in response to population change or price inflation will not affect TFP. If the population increases, 
for example, rents may rise relative to agricultural prices, while wages fall. Yet the index of TFP, 
if it is properly calculated, will remain the same.12 
11 The definition of TFP: Robert G. Chambers, Applied Production Analysis: A Dual Approach 
(Cambridge, 1 988), pp. 235-39. For a derivation of equations I and 2, see appendix 5.
12 Imagine, for example, that a growing population drove wages down relative to agricultural 
prices and pushed rents up, while TFP remained constant. The cost index C would decline relative 
to the price index P, while rent and hence (r + t) rose, but the change in rent would be just enough 
to compensate for the change in prices and wages, leaving TFP = (r + t)'C/P constant. Note that 
measuring the prices here either in money of account, as I have done, or in precious metal would yield 
the same answer for TFP and for its rate of change. Converting prices to silver, for instance, would 
simply multiply the numerator and the denominator in equation (2) by the same number; because the 
product and factor shares sum to I. TFP would thus be unchanged.
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3. What the method of calculating TFP assumes
The whole method of calculating TFP, of course, is open to certain objections. Some are 
technical and are discussed elsewhere.13 More important, however, and far more interesting, are 
the assumptions underlying the whole exercise, which may evoke a few howls of execration from 
economists and historians alike: that the agricultural technology can be described with some precision 
for a period of three centuries, that agricultural markets existed, and that the land rental market was 
competitive. They obviously deserve detailed scrutiny. 
The first assumption is that we know the agricultural technology well enough to calculate the 
factor and product shares that enter into the formula for TFP. One might suppose that we these 
shares could be recovered from clever regressions with rents, prices, and wages, but such a tactic is 
doomed to failure even with the most drastic simplifications. 14 
The alternative is to derive the shares from the records of a typical farm in the region. I have 
done so for the farm of Bernonville, located some 1 50 kilometers north of Paris, near the town of 
Saint-Quentin. When its accounts for the year 1 765 were published in 1 767, Bernon ville was 
described as an average large farm, one that was by no means exceptional. And although it lay 
further from Paris than any of our properties, its technology differed little from what one finds 
elsewhere in the grain growing regions of the Paris Basin. In the Brie, to the southeast of Paris, in 
the Beauce, to the southwest, on the plains north of the city, and to its immediate south, farmers grew 
the same crops, hired similar numbers of workers, and used nearly the same number of animals, and 
their farm accounts yielded similar product and factor shares. In Bernon ville, for instance, 80 percent 
of the revenue came from grain crops; on a farm in the Brie in the 1 730s, 77 percent did. The factor 
share of land in Bernonville was 27 percent; in the Brie, 3 1  percent. And if we turn to another farm, 
located some 20 kilometers north of Paris and investigated by Gilles Postel-Vinay and J. M. Moriceau, 
the numbers turn out much the same.15 
Factor and product shares thus seem to have varied little from farm to farm near Paris, and 
tile Bernonville shaies would appeal to fit the agrieultl!fal te�ple-prop..,,e'"rut,,je,,sLv�e'"r4'-----­
well, at least in the eighteenth century. One might worry, though, that factor and product shares 
changed over time. Modern economic growth has accustomed us to increases in the factor share of 
labor, and in early modern Europe whole regions--Western England, for example--were transformed 
by the coming of a pastoral economy, which diminished the product share of grain. 
Such was not the case, however, near Paris during the period under study. The occasional 
tenancy contracts we have from other landlords, in which tenants paid a portion of the output as rent, 
point to similar factor and product shares in the seventeenth century. Death inventories imply that 
the use of labor and livestock had not changed significantly as far back as the sixteenth century. The 
number of plowmen hired may have declined somewhat during the eighteenth century, but the overall 
effect on the labor factor share was small. Furthermore, if the factor shares of land and labor had 
shifted drastically, then we should be able to detect it from demographic data, but no such shift is 
13 See appendix 5.  
14 In particular, we might try to deduce the shares from a regression of profits on prices and 
wages. Although we do not know profits directly, we could approximate them by taxes and rents, 
treating land as a fixed factor and assuming that the rental market would equate profits with the rent 
and taxes that are the returns to land. The problem, however, is that if we include a realistic number 
of prices in the regression we run into intractable problems of multicollinearity, which are aggravated 
by the choice of anything but the simplest form for the profit function. On the other hand, if we 
reduce the number of prices, the regression coefficients have the wrong sign because of the variables 
that have been omitted. Differencing the equations does not resolve the problem. 
15 The Bernonville shares included 14 inputs and 1 3  outputs; see appendix 6 for details. 
6 
apparent, at least before the late eighteenth century.16 
Nor do product shares in total revenue seem to have changed. Farmers did plant new crops, 
such as artificial meadows, but the effect on the overall proportion of outputs was small. Farmers 
near Paris had specialized in grain production as early as the late Middle Ages; they continued to do 
so into the nineteenth century. What animal products they produced, such as wool from the sheep 
that fertilized the arable, derived from grain production, and relative prices never shifted in favor 
of additional livestock. Indeed, since much specialization in early modern Europe was driven by 
workings of the transportation costs on relative prices--farmers hundreds of miles from cities might 
raise easy-to-transport livestock, while those nearby tilled fields of wheat--it is no wonder that our 
farms, all near Paris, never abandoned arable farming.17 
While the assumption of constant product and factor shares appears reasonable, it would be 
prudent to check the sensitivity of our results to variations in the share values. To do so, we shall rely 
upon an alternate set of product and factor shares from a farm north of Paris, whose accounts have 
been analyzed by Gilles Postel-Vinay and J. M. Moriceau. Although the Bernonville and the alternate 
shares resemble one another, there are a few differences, for the Postel-Vinay and Moriceau farm 
had specialized to a certain extent in the production of oats. Indeed, one might argue that the 
differences were as great as one might expect between two farms on the outskirts of Paris. 
Nonetheless, as we shall see below, the alternate shares yield similar estimates for TFP.18 
The formula for TFP also assumes the existence of rudimentary markets in which the factors 
of production can be purchased and farm products sold. We must be able to measure prices in these 
markets, in order to calculate the indexes C and P in formula (2) for TFP. Not all of a farmer's 
dealings need have passed through the product and factor markets, merely a portion. It would not 
matter, for example, that a farmer employed some family members provided he also hired servants. 
Nor would it matter that he consumed some of his crops provided he also sold a portion. As long as 
he had some involvement in the markets, though, it would be fair to say that the costs and the prices 
he faced equalled those dictated by the market, once we allowed for the costs of transportation and 
of market preparation. 
Here, obviously, we may raise some historians' hackles, for Old-Regime farmers are often 
considered self sufficient peasants, who were thoroughly isolated from markets. The evidence, 
though, suggests that self sufficiency itself was largely a myth. This was certainly the case in the 
Paris Basin. Nearly all the peasants in the region either cultivated wine for sale, worked on the side 
as farm laborers, or rented land in a tight land market. By no stretch of the imagination were they 
self sufficient.19 
There remains the practical problem of actually measuring wages. Ideally we would like the 
wage of farm labor, preferably unskilled. Farm wages, though, are difficult to appraise since 
domestics were often paid a considerable portion of their earnings in kind and since salaries varied 
from season to season and from task to task. Even for a given task, the salary range could be 
considerable because of differences in strength and skill. The only alternative, it seems, is to use 
16 The reason demographic data is useful here is that under constant factor shares the ratio of rent 
to wages will be proportional to the ratio of labor to land, which we can approximate by the rural 
population. For details concerning this and the following paragraph, see appendix 6. 
17 One should not forget the importance of vineyards in certain parts of the Paris Basin; they 
remained important up to the nineteenth century. 
18 For the factor shares from the Postel-Vinay and Moriceau farm, see appendix 6. 
19 Skeptical readers may consult the lengthy discussion in Philip T. Hoffman, "Social History and 
Agricultural Productivity: The Paris Basin, i 4 50-i800," California Institute of TechnoJogy Social 
Science Working Pap.er 742 (June, 1 990) [henceforth SSWP 742] 
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urban wages for unskilled building workers. Calculating the mode of the observed wages would 
capture what the average unskilled building worker earned and allow us to overcome differences in 
strength and skill. One might object that urban and rural wages were different, but fifteenth and 
sixteenth-century evidence from the region around Paris suggests that wages for unskilled day 
laborers in the city differed little from those prevalent in the countryside, at least during the harvest 
when farmers hired day laborers from the city. "In the sixteenth century, the wages of two laborers, 
one working in the fields and other in the city, were identical," says Micheline Baulant, who has 
studied wages around Paris, and her data support her assertion. An unskilled urban helper earned 2.5 
sous a day in 1 500-05 and 10.4 sous a day in 1 594-98; a hotteur in the grape harvest earned 2.5 sous 
in 1 500-05 and 1 0  �in 1 594-95.20 
Even if there were sometimes differences between wages in the city and wages in the 
countryside, the trend of pay for the unskilled was nearly everywhere the same, and it is this trend, 
and not absolute prices, that we need to establish changes in our cost index C and thereby in our 
formula for TFP. For nearly all unskilled occupations, both within the city and without, wages 
moved in parallel--or at least this is what the evidence from the Paris region suggests.21 
Of course, one should not jump to the conclusion that a national labor market existed. Labor 
markets were regional, although the one about Paris was undoubtedly large enough to embrace the 
localities from which our leases were drawn. Nor should one overlook evidence that the labor market 
was perhaps segmented, with farmers in certain places and at certain times able to hire cheap labor 
at a cost that bore only a slight relationship to the wages paid in Paris. There is some evidence for 
such segmentation, but given the current state of research it is as yet neither overwhelming nor 
convincing. Differences in remuneration were not large and they may simply have reflected the 
heterogeneity of labor, the complexities of in-kind pay, and variations in the cost of living. And it 
is difficult to argue for complete segmentation in face of the enormous mobility of labor in the Paris 
Basin under the Old Regime. Parisian workers, we know, helped take in the harvest. Domestics quit 
the farm for the city, while paupers fleeing rural poverty did the same. And whole families moved 
------��1 towns about Paris, presumably in sear�LworJ< Given such mobility 
particularly between Paris and the countryside, it seems unlikely that the regional labor market was 
partitioned into isolated and mutually exclusive compartments. 22 
As with agricultural labor, our method also requires the existence of markets for agricultural 
capital--in particular livestock. Fortunately, long distance markets for horses, cattle, and sheep reach 
far back into the past, and although prices series for livestock are skimpy and one has to be careful 
of differences between breeds, it is possible to assemble the necessary series of cost trends--or at least 
gross averages for twenty-five year periods, which is all that is necessary for our cost index C in the 
20 Micheline Baulant, "Prix et salaires a Paris au XVIe siecle: Sources et resultats," Annales E.S.C.
3 1 ( 1 976):980-86; Guy Fourquin, Les campagnes de la region parisienne a la fin du moven age (Paris,
1 964) ,  p. 496; Pierre Goubert, Beauvais et le Beauvaisis de 1600 a 1 730, 2 vols. (Paris, 1960; reprint
ed. 1 982), 1 : 1 39-40, 547-60; and Jean-Pierre Gutton, Domestigues et serviteurs dans la France de 
l'ancien regime (Paris, 198 1  ), pp. 1 1 1 - 1 17.  
21 Baulant, "Prix et salaires a Paris," pp. 980-986; idem, "Le salaire des ouvriers du batiment a 
Paris de 1 400- 1 726," Annales E.S.C. 26( 1 97 1 ):463-83. This is sixteenth-century evidence; for 
evidence for later periods, see appendix 7. The sources for the wages and the prices that enter into 
the calculation of the indexes C and P are listed in appendix 14 .  
2 2  See Baulant, "Le salaire des ouvriers," p. 472; idem, "Prix et salaires," pp. 980-87; Marcel 
Lachiver, La population de Meulan du XVIIe au XIXe siecle (vers 1 600- 1870) (Paris, 1 969), pp. 9 1 -
1 22; Jacques Beaud and Georges Bouchart. 11Le ctepOt des pauvres de Saint-Denis ( 1 768- 1 792)," 
Annales de demographie historique, 1 974, pp. 1 27-43; Hoffman, SSWP 742; and appendix 7 .  
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formula for TFP.23 
For the price index P in the formula for TFP, we need prices of agriculture outputs, and here 
it is grain that poses the most daunting problems. The price of grain was volatile and therefore 
difficult to measure. Long run averages can dampen the price volatility, but it is not clear what 
period one should average over. Furthermore, the cost of transporting grain was high enough to drive 
a wedge between the farm gate price and the market price that enters into our agricultural price index 
P. If the wedge were large enough or if it varied considerably it could distort our index of TFP.24 
The difficulties here, though, are far from insurmountable. While we cannot be absolutely 
certain about what years to average prices over, employing the current year and the previous eight 
years (in other words, averaging over the outgoing lease) seems concordant with contemporary 
practices. We shall therefore calculate P and C using the Bernonville shares and Paris prices averaged 
over the outgoing lease. Table 1 displays the resulting decennial averages of the price-cost ratio P /C, 
which is all we need to calculate TFP. Of course, we can check the sensitivity of our results to this 
process of averaging by using prices from a radically different set of years in the indexes P and C. 
We shall do so, using prices averaged over the life of the new lease, or in other words, over the 
current year and eight years into the future. This alternate set of prices makes strong demands of our 
tenant farmers (namely, that they be able to see 8 years into future), but as we shall see below, it does 
not change the index of TFP greatly. 25 
As for transportation costs, although they drove a wedge between grain prices in distant 
markets, the long-run average price trends--all that is necessary for our price index P--tended to 
move together, as long as the markets were not too far apart. Around Paris, for instance, grain prices 
in local markets were lower and more volatile than in Paris in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and 
eighteenth centuries, but price trends in the local markets up to 100 kilometers away tended to follow 
the trend of the Paris price, particularly if one examines averages that smooth out local crises. Such 
parallel movement should hardly be surprising, for there is considerable evidence that merchants and 
even large scale peasants carried out what amounted to intermarket arbitrage in the sixteenth, 
seventeenth, and eighteenth centunes. Wl!h md1v1duals buying and selling once p1 iee gapse'•W•±<id'lie'111><e*El1',----­
i t  is no wonder that grain prices, though different in absolute terms, exhibited similar trends.26 
The last assumption we need is that untaxed profits from farming eventually went to 
landlords--or in other words, that the land rental market was competitive with no barriers to tenant 
entry. In the short run, it is clear, such was not always the case, for it might take a landlord time to 
renew a lease or even to realize that more could be squeezed out of a property. What concerns us, 
though, is the long run. Unlike the markets for labor, livestock, and agricultural products, which 
swarmed with hundreds of minuscule actors, the land rental market in any given village might involve 
23 Throughout this paper, the price of all capital goods was a rental price, which equalled the sales 
prices multiplied by interest plus depreciation; see appendix 6 for details. 
24 Meuvret, Subsistances, vol. 3. Since much grain reached the consumers in the form of in-kind 
payments or self production, one might suppose that the farm gate price of grain bore no relationship 
to the market price, but such was not the case near Paris. On this point, see appendix 8. · 
25 See appendix 9. Prices were too fragmentary to calculate P/C before 1 520. 
26 Steven L. Kaplan, Provisioning Parjs: Merchants and Millers in the Grain and Flour Trade 
during the Eighteenth Century (Ithaca, 1984), pp. 206, 2 1 5 - 16; Jacquart, Crise rurale, pp. 764-66; 
Jacques Dupaquier, et al, Mercuriales du pays de France et du Vexin francais (1640- 1 792), p. 233; 
Micheline Baulant and Jean Meuvret, Prix des cereales extraits de la mercuriale de Paris (1520- 1 698), 
2 vols. (Paris, 1960-62), 1 : 12 ,  25. As we shall discuss below, hinterland prices did rise relative to the 
Paris price between the seventeenth and the eighteenth century: iviicheline Baulant. 11Le prix des
grains a Paris de 1431 a 1 788," Annales E.S.C. 23(1968): 520-40.
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only a small number of tenants, who could conceivably drive rents down and thereby retain some of 
the profits of farming even in the Jong run. In a few parts of France--areas of so-called mauvais gre 
or droit de marche--tenants actually wielded such power, but mauvais gre was unknown throughout 
most of the area where our farms were located. 27 
One bit of evidence that might nevertheless be construed as a sign of tenant market power is 
the lower per-hectare rent sometimes found on big farms and large plots of land, the argument being 
that tenants able to take on a large farm were powerful enough to force down the rental price. 28 
To judge from regressions of Jn( rent) on variables affecting rent levels (Table 2, regression I), even
Notre Dame's larger properties rented for somewhat Jess per hectare. 
But it would be wrong to conclude that Notre Dame's tenants pushed down the rent, for there 
is a very different explanation for the lower per-hectare rent that large plots sometimes fetched, an 
explanation that does not depend in the slightest on the market power of tenants. We should recall 
that renting out land, even for a fixed rent, involved risks for the early modern landlord. His property 
might be ruined by neglect, or, worse yet, the tenant might fall behind paying the rent or not pay it 
at all. Such risks were far from insignificant, even for small plots of land.29 Because of them, a 
landlord might have to seek a judgement against a tenant or seize his assets. The problem, though, 
was that only the large scale tenants had assets such as livestock or equipment that a landlord could 
attach. The landlord could therefore allow big fermiers fall into arrears, knowing full well that their 
livestock and equipment served as collateral for their debts. With small scale tenants, however, the 
landlord had no such assurances, and his only recourse was to demand a risk premium in the form of 
higher rent payments. The higher rent was thus compensation for the risks posed by tenants without 
collateral. 
Evidence of a different sort also casts doubt on the market power of tenants in the Paris basin. 
Large scale tenants in the region commonly switched farms during their careers. Their mobility 
would fit a world in which landlords easily introduced new tenants from other villages. They also had 
large families, and while one could perhaps imagine co!lusion between two or three tenant patriarchs 
-
-
-
-
-
--tin-to"t"dlee.,--1 · to-depress local relits tempmr' , · · · · �n>Ee.,e-tt'llhcfle-----
patriarchs tried to establish their numerous children on farms.30 They would compete with one 
another to settle their children, and their heirs would do the same. Collusion, even if it existed, 
would be hard to maintain. 
27 Hoffman, SSWP 742. A droit de marche did exist in certain areas north of Paris: Postel-Vinay, 
La rente fonciere (Paris, 1974) pp. 44-49; and Jean Vinchon, Le livre de raison d'une famille picarde: 
Les Vinchon (1488- 1947) (Doullens, 1948), pp. 36-37, 98- 1 03.  But it was largely unknown 
throughout the rest of the Basin and even to the north of Paris it was hardly universal: Jacquart, 
"Rente fonciere," p. 375. 
28 Postel-Vinay, La rente fonciere, pp. 35-54; George Grantham, "Agricultural Supply during the 
Industrial Revolution: French Evidence and European Implications" Journal of Economic History 
49( 1989):43-72; Gerard Beaur, Le marche fancier, pp. 263-64. 
29 Charles Estienne, L'agriculture et la maison rustique (Paris, 1 564), fols. 8-9; L'art d'augmenter 
son bien ou regles generales pour !'administration d'une terre (Paris, 1 784 ), pp. 10- 1 7, 1 7 1 -75; Abbe
Fran,ois Rozier, Cours complet d'agriculture, I 0 vols. (Paris, 1 78 1 - 1 800), vol 2, sv "bail"; AN LL337-
38,  fols. 96- 1 0 1  ( 1 748), fols. 236-37 ( 1 747); LL 350-5 1 ,  fols. 1 22-24 ( 1 76 1 -62); S 242(1 754-62); S247 
( 1 693); s 176 ( 1 666-69).
30 Jean-Marc Moriceau, "Un systeme de protection sociale efficace: Exemple des vieux fermiers 
de !'Ile-de-France (XV!Ie-debut XIXe siecle)," Annales de demographie historique ( 1985), pp. 127-
44. Those tenants who did linger were probabiy the best, retained by the landlord for their mutual
benefit. 
IO 
Note: 
Table 2 - REGRESSIONS WITH LN(RENT) AND LN(TFP) 
Regression Number 
Dependent Variable 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Constant 
Dummy: Years 1775 
and After 
Dummy: War Years 
1589-1597 
Percent Meadow 
Percent Vineyard 
Dummy: Good Soil 
Distance to Patis 
in Kilometers) 
Dummy: Tenant Holdover 
from Previous Lease 
Time (Units of 
100 Years) 
Ln(Property Area 
in Hectares) 
Ln (Area per 
Property Parcel) 
Observations 
R2 
Standard Error 
Mean of 
Dependent Variable 
Condition Number of 
Single-value Decomposition 
(1) (2) (3) 
Ln(Rent) Ln(TFP) Ln(TFP) 
-11.23 0.079 0.1 1  
(-16.69) (0.42) (0.60) 
0.075 0.064 0.056 
(0.60) (1.97) ( 1.80) 
-0.097 -0.29 -0.28 
(-0.71) (-8.08) (-8.30) 
0.39 0.16 0.1 1  
(2.09) (3.25) (2.51) 
0.0018 0.014 0.15 
(0.005) (0.13) ( 1.50) 
0.0050 0.00093 0.0041 
(0.09) (0.06) (0.28) 
-0.27 0.067 0.079 
(-6.24) (-5.94) (-5. 76) 
0.021 0.019 0.026 
(0.42) ( 1.42) (2.01) 
0.91 0.061 0.063 
(23.1 1) (5.49) (5.82) 
-0.085 -0.024 -0.050 
(-3.42) (-3.68) (-7.46) 
0.043 
(6.91) 
652 638 581 
0.57 0.31 0.37 
0.63 0.17 0.15 
2.70 0.79 0.80 
87.41 93.46 92.83 
Years before 1520 are omitted; T-statistics are in parentheses. T he TFP figures are 
adjusted for taxes. 
Source: Sample of leases and property description; additional sources described in appendix 14. 
Finally, if tenant dynasties did in fact hold down rents and capture a share of the untaxed 
profits, then rent increases would have been significantly lower when the same tenant (or a relative) 
renewed a lease and significantly higher when an outsider was finally installed. But with our sample 
of leases, the rent never behaves in such a fashion. If we regress the rate at which ln(rent) increased 
from lease to lease on the rate of change in the agricultural price-cost ratio P /C and other variables 
affecting the rent, we find that retaining the same tenant depressed the rent by a microscopic and 
statistically insignificant amount (Table 3, regression ! ). If a relative of the old tenant renewed the 
lease, the effect was just as small. 
Such a result should not be surprising. Landlords renewed the leases every nine years and did 
so with an eye toward profits. Except in the regions of mauvais gre, nothing kept a landlord from 
eventually finding a new tenant, and with no barriers to entry, tenants could not long siphon off 
profits. One might worry about normal entrepreneurial profits the tenants made, but contemporary 
evidence suggests that in the long run these were too small to affect our TFP calculations.31 
While the use of prices and leases to calculate TFP may now seem reasonable, at least with our 
sample, one doubt may still linger in reader's mind. Accustomed to handling real physical quantities, 
he might like some reassurance that an index of TFP based on something so intangible as prices would 
really yield reliable results. Unfortunately, reliable physical measurements are almost always lacking. 
In one instance, though, where, thanks to an unusual set of family records, one can compare physical 
quantities produced and factors employed for a real eighteenth-century farm in the Paris Basin, the 
method of calculating TFP here gives extraordinarily accurate results. Neither the assumption of 
constant product and factor shares nor the use of prices in place of physical quantities seems to be 
misleading. 32 
4. The Notre Dame properties
a. Productivity trends
-------------1WJi"Tt-ttiih.,.e1111--,drto-the leases 1eveal? The-place to begin is-with the e•oltttton of TFP. FFOfllc-----­
equation (2), TFP equals (r + t)'C/P, where r is per-hectare rent, t is per-hectare taxes, s is the factor 
share of land, and C and P are the indexes of agricultural costs and prices. We do not know t 
precisely, but if we ignore taxes for the moment--an assumption to be corrected below--then the 
logarithm of TFP will be very nearly equal to sln(r) - ln(P/C), which we can average across properties 
31 For how rent was set and the size of entrepreneurial profits, see appendices 9 and 1 0. Our 
assumption is that tenants earned no more than they would have on the labor market; for a discussion 
and criticisms, see appendix 5. Note that we need not assume that the land supply is fixed or that the 
tenant farmers were profit maximizers, although without profit maximization, our definition of TFP 
has no necessary connection to technical change. We do have to assume the existence of a large 
number of risk-neutral tenants, but risk neutrality is not an absurd assumption for sort of wealthy 
fermiers who rented Notre Dame's farms. For them, even profit maximization is not unrealistic. For 
a discussion and other assumptions, see appendix 5 .  
32 The example, from data kindly furnished by Gilles Postel-Vinay, concerns the highly 
productive farm that provided our alternate shares. We can compare its productivity in the 1 740s and 
in the 1 780s using physical inputs and outputs via a Tornqvist productivity index. The index is 
equivalent to using a translog production function, but it allows us to compare productivity without 
doing regressions. With this technique we find that productivity on the farm rose 9.79 percent 
between the 1 740s and the 1 780s. If instead we use the method adopted throughout the rest of this 
paper--with shares that came from the Bernonville farm--we get very nearly the same thing, 9.03 
percent. Clearly, our results are very close to those given by the sophisticated translog; moreover, 
practically none of the difference between the two numbers was caused by the constant shares 
assumption. For details, see appendix 1 1 .  
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Table 3 - REGRESSIONS WITH GROWTH RATE OF RENT AND TFP 
Regression Number (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable Rent Growth Rate TFP Growth Rate TFP Growth Rate 
(Percent per Year) (Percent per Year) (Percent per Year) 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Constant 1.23 0.46 0.45 
(5.78) ( 1.32) ( 1.09) 
Growth Rate Price-Cost 0.61 
Ratio (7 .26) 
Growth Rate of Taxes -0.44 -4.11 -4.44 
Relative to Rents (-0.11) (-2.00) (-2.10) 
Growth Rate Paris 0.24 0.23 
Population (6.16) (5.88) 
Dummy: Years 1775 1.04 1.03 
and After (3.48) (3.35) 
Dummy: War Years -4.14 -2.44 -2.25 
A8.5) (� � lQ) 
Dummy: Repairs -0.31 -0.56 
(-0.85) (-1.39) 
Dummy: Tenant Holdover -0.17 -0.085 -0.041 
from Previous Lease (-0.58) (-0.64) (-0.29) 
LN (Distance to Paris -0.074 -0.083 
in Kilometers) (-0. 71) (-0.70) 
LN (Property Area -0.024 -0.012 
in Hectares) (-0.43) (-0.18) 
LN (Area per Parcel) -0.022 
(-0.34) 
Observations 648 648 593 
R2 0.086 0.20 0.19 
Standard Error 3.69 1.68 1.68 
Mean Dependent Variable 1.10 0.13 0.13 
Condition Number 2.57 14.34 16.63 
Note: Growth rates equal the rate of change of logarithms calculated from lease to lease. The 
price-cost ratio is as in Table 1, and the TFP growth rates are not adjusted for taxes. As is 
shown in appendix 13, the lack of a tax adjustment will not affect the regression coefficients, 
because the growth rate of taxes relative to rents figures among the explanatory variables. Years 
before 1520 omitted; T-statistics are in parentheses. 
Source: As in Table 2. 
for different periods. We can then chart, at least roughly, changes in TFP, and we can hone the 
accuracy of the graph by adjusting ln(r) for variations in land quality via the procedure used in Table 
1 .  
Figure 3 plots such an average for 25-year periods. It also charts average values of TFP 
computed with the alternate factor and product shares and with the alternate prices in the indexes P 
and C--prices that are averaged over the newly signed lease instead of over the outgoing one. All 
three curves are corrected for variations in land quality and location.33 The alternate shares and 
prices shift the graph of TFP somewhat, but they do not disturb the overall trend. The alternate 
shares tip the curve upward a bit--largely because the land share s is higher--but TFP still traces out 
the same peaks and valleys. The pattern with the alternate prices is also similar, except in 1650-74 
and 1 775-89, when its behavior may well be a fluke.34 Overall, though, TFP follows essentially the 
same path, whatever the shares and prices. 
Built in to Figure 3 is an adjustment for having omitted taxes in the calculation of TFP. 
Without such a correction, TFP growth would be understated, because of the increasingly heavy fiscal 
burden that the monarchy imposed upon the land. The size of the resulting error, though, turns out 
to be relatively small. It is shown for the Bernon ville shares and for prices averaged over the outgoing 
lease: Figure 3 plots TFP both before and after the tax adjustment. The graphs of TFP with 
alternative shares and prices include tax adjustments of a similar magnitude.35 
33 One alternative would be to average sln(r) and ln(P/C) separately, taking the mean of sln(r) 
over all the leases in each 25-year period and then subtracting ln(P/C) averaged over all the years in 
the period, rather than over all the leases. This procedure, though, yields results nearly 
indistinguishable from simply averaging ln(TFP) lease by lease; see appendix 1 2  for a discussion. We 
could also average ln(TFP) by decade, but the decennial averages obscure the trend. Finally, although 
it might seem promising to chart TFP for clusters of properties (the landlocked ones north of Paris, 
for example) or to smgle out farms with high rates of I FP growth, m the end neither technique 
proved illuminating. 
34 In 1 650-74 the TFP index with alternate prices is inflated--perhaps artificially--because it 
employs prices eight years into the future; it thus incorporates the depressed prices of the 1670s, when 
P/C is very low (Table I ,  column 5). Its jump in 1 7 75-89 may also be a fluke. Since our prices series
stops in 1 789, we cannot really incorporate prices eight years forward; rather, we have to calculate 
P/C in the late 1 780s with prices from only a few years from the late 1 780s, making the alternate 
price estimates suspect. 
35 Since TFP = (r + t)'C/P, omitting taxes t, as we have, would tend to understate both the level 
and the growth rate of TFP, if taxes were rising relative to rents. The precise taxes t for each piece 
of property will never be know precisely, but one reasonable assumption is that for the i-th property 
the fraction of gross rent (i.e. rent plus taxes) going to the landlord rather than to the fisc is g, where 
ln(g) = bln(t./r.) + ci. Here b is a negative constant, t. is the average per-capita tax assessment, r. 
is the average per-hectare rent, and ci is a constant that varies from property to property. Under this 
assumption, which amounts to saying that taxes were apportioned with an eye toward average rent 
and population levels, we can estimatethe magnitude of the error involved in omitting taxes from the 
formula for TFP. The way to do so, we show in appendix 13 ,  is to regress the growth rate of TFP 
measured without taxes on the growth rate of t./r., which we can derive from tax receipts, population 
statistics, and average rent levels. We then subtract the product of the growth rate of t.lr. and its 
regression coefficient from the measured growth rate of TFP in order to correct the measured growth 
rate of TFP for the omission of taxes. To adjust the measured level of TFP, we subtract the same 
regression coefficient times ln(t./r.). Table 3, column 2, contains the necessary regression, and the 
error involved in ignoring taxes turns out to be very small, particularly in the case of the growth rate 
of TFP. See appendix 1 3  for details. 
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Figure 3 :  Ln(TFP) for Alternate Prices and Shares
(Adjusted for Taxes and Land Quality) 
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The years from 1 450 to 1 524 have been excluded from Figure 3, because the prices needed 
for the indexes C and P become less reliable and the number of usable leases dwindles. As is well 
known, this earlier period had witnessed a recovery from the devastation wrought by the Hundred 
Years War. Tenants reoccupied abandoned farms, rebuilt walls and barns, and cleared fields 
overgrown with weeds. The process of reconstruction swept on well into the sixteenth century, 
particularly in villages that were cursed with poor soil or situated far from Paris. As late as 1 545, for 
example, Notre Dame was still clearing land in the village of La-Grande-Paroisse, 77 kilometers off 
to the southeast of Paris, where one of their tenants, Jean Godet, had to reclaim 9 hectares of briar­
choked meadow. Gode! also had to enclose the meadow with ditches in order to keep wandering 
animals out, evidence that the process had extended beyond mere rebuilding to become one of general 
improvement to the soi!.36 
If the wave of improvements persisted well into the sixteenth century, then it might explain 
the relatively high levels of TFP we observe in 1 550-7 4 (Figure 3). Investment hidden in 
improvements would boost rents and thereby appear--somewhat erroneously--as higher TFP. It 
would also explain the rapid pace of TFP growth. Between 1 500-24 and 1 550-74, TFP grew between 
0.3 and 0.4 percent a year, a brilliant mark by early modern standards and one that compares 
favorably with the English performance, as we shall see, even two centuries later.37 
In all likelihood, however, the cause of the higher productivity in 1 550-74 lies elsewhere, not 
in recuperation and improvements after the Hundred Year War. In the first place, information 
contained in the leases often allows us to deduct the portion of the rent that reflects improvements, 
at least when buildings are concerned. When it is deducted, however, the rent and consequently the 
TFP estimates hardly change. One could argue that clearing and other investments in land would not 
leave a trace in the leases, but clearing was unlikely to have continued after 1 550, particularly on 
properties close to Paris, where the TFP increases in the middle of the century were largest. The 
farms near Paris had suffered much less during the Hundred Years War and they would in any case 
have been rebuilt long before in the fifteenth century, not as late as 1 550 nor even after 1 525.38 
Evidently, some other force was pushing--'fFP--ttpwd in the mid sixteenth eentury,--a-·'"fo'"r"e"'e,__,,thuattt�---­
waxed stronger near Paris. Perhaps it was the opportunities offered by proximity to a large city--a 
point to which we shall return below. 
After the heights of 1 550-74, TFP plummeted during the Wars of Religion (Figure 3). If we 
compute the growth rate of TFP from lease to lease and average it across properties, we see that it too 
plunged, confirming the dismal picture at the close of the 1 500s.39 Between 1 5 50-74 and 1 575-99, 
TFP fell 5 percent or more, depending on which shares and prices we employ. This was a an 
enormous amount for early modern Europe, where even stunning agricultural productivity growth 
was eked out a few tenths of a percent per year. 
The cause of the collapse was undoubtedly war. The decline was most precipitous during and 
immediately after the years 1 589-94, the period of most intense fighting in the Paris Basin, when 
undisciplined armies traversed the region, sowing devastation in their wake. It was during these 
accursed years when soldiers wreaked the greatest havoc. Not content to trample crops, seize livestock 
and grain, and burn farm buildings to the ground, they resorted to extortion and kidnapping and 
36 AN S407 ( 1 464), S 272 ( 1 522, 1 545), S 409 ( 1 479, 1482, 1 483, 1498, 1 5 1 1 ). Cf. Fourquin, Les 
campagnes, pp. 389-97, 430-53 1 ,  Map 5. 
37 The 0.3 to 0.4 percent range covers the growth rates one gets with all the various shares and 
prices. In calculating the growth rate, I took into account the fact that the leases used to compute TFP 
in 1 500-24 all cluster after 1 520. 
38 Fourquin, Les campagnes, pp. 389-97, 430-53 1 ;  Jacquart, Crise rurale, pp. 42-47. 
39 See Figure A-3 in the appendices. 
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completely disrupted trade. Understandably, many a farmer fled, abandoning his farm to weeds or 
to pillage. Notre Dame's tenant, Bernaye, quit his lease in La Grande Paroisse in 1 594 because of 
attacks by soldiers, and warfare left their farm in Dampmart abandoned and ruined in 1 597. During 
the worst period of anarchy and plunder, TFP dropped by perhaps 25 percent.40 
Such were the heavy consequences of war. To be sure, the index of TFP might seem ill suited 
for gauging the effects of such transitory events, since it was designed to measure only long term 
trends. Yet the evidence suggests that the plunge of TFP during the Wars of Religion was in fact real. 
What pushed TFP down in the 1 590s was not a decline in rent but a sharp upswing in agricultural 
prices (Table 1 ). Leaping prices, though, were themselves a sign of markets disrupted and of products 
destroyed.41 
The peaceful opening years of the seventeenth century brought a brief respite. Productivity 
growth increased sharply and the average level of TFP rose. Then, in the second quarter of the 
century, TFP declined (Figures 3). The lower levels of TFP probably resulted from the heavy taxes 
imposed to fund the kingdom's involvement in the Thirty Years War. Our TFP figures were of course 
adjusted for taxes, but the adjustment concerned only that portion of the farm profits or surplus that 
went to the fisc instead of to the landlord. Skyrocketing taxes could have also wreaked havoc by 
disrupting the agrarian economy. Tax increases, after all, pushed peasants into debt and led to the 
frequent seizure of livestock and other agricultural capital for the payment of back taxes. Along with 
troop movements during the Fronde and a series of disastrous harvests in the early 1630s, the tax­
provoked disruptions fit the chronology of declining TFP in 1 625-49 and no doubt lay behind it.42 
The following century witnessed a recovery and then slow growth (Figure 3). At least part 
of the apparent gains in the century after 1650 was in fact a mirage, reflecting a decline in 
transportation costs rather than increased agricultural productivity. The cost of transport, we recall, 
drove a wedge between farm gate prices and Paris prices for bulky commodities such as grain and 
thus reduced rents as one moved away from the city. Since our calculation of TFP is based on Paris 
prices, and since the measure of TFP combines low local rents with high Paris grain prices, we 
undoubtedly underestimate the absolute level of I FP tor farms distant from me-ctty.  The reason, 
again, is the simple fact that local rents adjust to transportation costs and local prices, not the higher 
prices prevailing in Paris. 
As long as local grain prices moved in parallel with Paris--the usual pattern--there would be 
no cause for worry. Although absolute levels of TFP might err slightly, trends in productivity and 
rates of productivity growth would be the same. But over the course of the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries, local prices in markets such as Pontoise and Soissons rose slightly to approach 
40 AN LL 329-30, La Grande Paroisse ( 1 594); S 242 (25 June 1 597); Jacquart, Crise rurale, pp. 
1 7 1 -207. The 24-percent decline in TFP comes from Table 2, regression 2, which is discussed below. 
41 The regression with ln(rent) also suggests that rising prices, rather than declining rents, lay 
behind the drop in TFP, for the dummy variable for the war years 1 589-97 does not have a large or 
significant coefficient (Table 2,  regression 1 ). The chief argument against the reality of the TFP drop 
would run something as follows: the siege of Paris in 1 589-90 might have temporarily driven up the 
Paris grain prices that figure in our index P (thereby depressing TFP), even though farm gate prices 
and true TFP in fact remained the same. But the index P averages prices for the current year and for 
the eight years of the previous lease; it is therefore unlikely to be swayed unduly by any single year 
of crisis. Furthermore, some local markets show the same spike in prices in 1 589-90 as does Paris, 
which suggests that the price increase was not confined to the city: Jacquart, Crise rurale, p. 765. As 
it turns out, we observe the same decline of TFP with the alternate shares and prices. 
42 Jacquart, Crise rurale, pp. 623-99. 
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those prevailing in Paris, and the gap between the Paris price and the local prices closed.43 
What was happening was that transportation costs were dropping. The increase in local prices 
relative to the Paris price was more pronounced the further one went from Paris, just as one would 
expect if the cost of transportation was falling. Such declining costs were themselves a mark of 
increased productivity, but in transportation rather than in farming.44 Unfortunately, our measure 
of TFP would mistakenly confound the two. Rents would increase as local grain prices converged to 
the Paris price, but since we would be judging rents relative to a Paris price index P, it would seem 
that TFP was rising, particularly on distant farms, where the effect of declining transportation costs 
was most conspicuous. It was precisely on such farms that the productivity gains in the late 
seventeenth century seemed largest. 
Prices in markets outside of Paris can reveal how much of the TFP growth between 1650-74 
and 1 750-74 actually resulted from declining costs of transportation and from the concomitant rise 
in local prices. Let us consider, for instance, a market far from Paris, where the shift in grain prices 
relative to Paris was large. Soissons provides a perfect example: at nearly 1 00 kilometers from Paris, 
it was farther away than any property in our sample. Not surprisingly, the increase of grain prices 
in Soissons relative to Paris accounts for a 8 .3 percent rise in our measure of TFP between 1650-74 
and 1750-74, roughly three quarters of the 1 1 .3 percent gain we observe if we compute TFP with the 
Bernonville shares and with prices averaged over the outgoing lease.45 
Closer to Paris, the convergence of the local prices to the Paris price has much less of an effect 
on our measurement of TFP. At a market such as Pontoise, approximately 30 kilometers from Paris, 
convergence of prices explains only a 3.6 percent increase in the same TFP measure over the same 
period. Clearly, Pontoise provides the example that is relevant to our sample of properties, for they 
lie on average a little less than 40 kilometers from the city, not 1 00 kilometers away. Between 1650-
74 and 1 750-74, then, true agricultural TFP grew by perhaps only 7.7 percent--the other 3.6 percent 
we measure resulted from better transportation. The better transportation should of course not be 
slighted: it helped feed the growing city of Paris as much as did more efficient farms. 
---------AActf1'te"1r"--Hlthe--eefrtttfy-6f�aeeelerated in the late eighteenth eentury 
(Figure 3). Between 1750-74 and 1 775-89 TFP vaulted 6.5 percent, if we measure it with the 
Bernonville shares and outgoing prices. The spike at the end of the Old Regime stands out even more 
clearly if we look at rates of growth. They averaged above 0.3 percent a year between 1 750-74 and 
1 775-89 and reached a peak of over I percent, rates that are comparable or superior to the pace
achieved across the English Channel. Indeed, in the early 1 8th century, when TFP growth in English 
agriculture seemed to crest, it was gaining 0.6 percent annually, according to N. F. R. Crafts; later 
in the century, he estimates, the growth rate was only 0.2 percent. Robert Allen's work on the 
English Midlands points to a similar range: between 0.2 and 0.3 percent over the seventeenth and 
43 Meuvret, Subsistences, vol. 3,  pt. 2: 1 1 6-34; Baulant, "Le prix des grains"; AN F l  I 207 (Soissons
price, corrected following the indications in Goubert, Beauvais, 1:408); Dupaquier, Mercuriales. 
Graphs of the Soissons and Pontoise prices show that they rose roughly 5 to I 0 percent relative to the 
Paris price between 1 650 and 1 750, with more of an increase in distant Soissons than in Pontoise. 
44 For direct evidence of declining costs of transportation, see J. Letaconnoux, "Les transports 
en France au 1 8  siecle," Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine 1 1 ( 1 908-09): 97- 1 14 ,  269-92. 
Part of the improved transportation undoubtedly involved the arduous task of establishing networks 
of specialized middlemen, a subject I shall pursue further in a forthcoming book. Separating 
agriculture and transportation here is of course somewhat artificial since much of the grain was carted 
to market by the farmers themselves. 
45 Prices at Rozay-en-Brie suggest a similarly large role for transportation in the period 1 650-74 
to 1 725-45, when the Rozay price series unfortunately stops. 
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eighteenth centuries. 46 Agriculture in the Paris Basin was thus hardly lagging behind England; in 
fact, its performance seems positively buoyant. 
But was the late eighteenth-century increase in TFP in the Paris Basin illusory? Did it, at 
least in part, mirror declining transportation costs, as with the slow growth in the years before 1 750? 
The answer this time is no. In the first place, after 1 775, our index of TFP rose no faster on distant 
properties than on those near Paris, the opposite of what one would expect with declining transport 
costs. Local prices, moreover, had by 1 750 ceased rising relative to the Paris price, and their 
movement no longer accounts for any of the increase in TFP. Prices in Soissons explain perhaps a 1 .8  
percent increase in  our measure of  TFP between 1 750-74 and 1 775-89; those in Pontoise--the ones 
relevant to our sample--explain none at all. 
The measure of TFP used here, it is true, may lag a bit behind reality. It took time to renew 
a lease, time to determine that a tenant was thriving and that the rent could be ratcheted upward. A 
wise landlord might wait before demanding more from his tenant, lest the tenant go bankrupt and the 
landlord receive nothing. Notre Dame, for example, investigated several tenants in the late 1750s, 
discovered that they were profiting and ruled out the prospect of bankruptcy. Only then did it raise 
the rent. If such a pattern were general, the increase of productivity could have begun earlier than 
the graphs suggest.47 
Whether the upturn began slightly earlier or not, there is nothing to suggest that the 
eighteenth-century jump in TFP was peculiar to the properties owned by Notre Dame. Nominal rent 
increases of 79 to 1 20 percent between the 1 730s and 1 780s were common in Ile-de-France, Picardy, 
and the Beauce. On the Notre Dame's farms the increase was 105 percent (Table l ,  column 2). Since 
the trend of prices and taxes was similar throughout the environs of Paris, TFP must have grown by 
a like amount on farms throughout the region.48 
b. Regression results
---------lRtie,.,g011"'e""ss.tir>o�n analysis eorroberates this three-c-ent�4¥it¥-Change and helps_u,�----­
refine our results. In the regressions the dependent variables are the logarithm of TFP and its growth 
rate, both calculated lease by lease. Here ln(TFP) is computed from equation (2) using Bernonville 
shares, prices averaged over the outgoing lease, and rent without an adjustment for land quality. 
Alternative prices and shares yield similar results, and we can correct for land quality and for the use 
46 N. F. R. Crafts, British Economic Growth during the Industrial Revolution (Oxford, 1 985), 
pp. 83-85; Robert Allen, "The Growth of Labor Productivity in Early Modern English Agriculture," 
Explorations in Economic History 25( 1 988): 1 17-46. 
47 AN S 242, 1 754-62 (Dampmart); S 282, 1 746-55, and S 460, 1 782 (La Grande Paroisse). 
48 Beaur, Marche foncier, pp. 262-68; Bertrandy-Lacabane, Bretigny-sur-Orge, pp. 3 1 4- 1 5; 
Veyrassat-Herren and Ladurie, "La rente fonciere." Historians might wonder whether increased 
competition among tenants or improved accounting by landlords (an outgrowth perhaps of the oft 
discussed "feudal" reaction in the eighteenth century) allowed landlords to squeeze more from their 
tenants in the late eighteenth century, thus explaining the rent increase we observe. The problem 
with such an argument is that there is no sign of increased turnover among tenants in the late 
eighteenth century, which we would expect with increased competition among tenants or excessive 
pressure frorr1 landlords. Furthermore. there are numerous examples of pressure on tenants in earlier 
periods as well. I will discuss these issues at greater length in a forthcoming book. 
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of Paris prices by including quality and locational measures among the explanatory variables.49 
The regression with ln(TFP) confirms that TFP plunged during the worst phase of the Wars 
of Religion. The coefficient of the dummy variable for the terrible years 1 5 89-97 (the period of the 
most intense fighting around Paris plus the following 3-year crop cycle) translates into a 25 percent 
drop in TFP, and the !-statistic is too large for it to be a fluke (Table 2, regression 2). Similarly, TFP 
really does jump after 1 775--by 6.6 percent if we judge from the coefficient of the variable for the 
years after 1 775.  As for the rest of the three centuries, the coefficient of the year, which averages 
TFP growth outside the periods 1 589-97 and 1 775-89, is certainly consistent with our story of rapid 
gains in the early sixteenth century, a sharp recovery after 1 589-97, a crisis in 1625-50, and slow 
growth for the following century.50 
Like the analysis of local prices in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the regressions 
also argue against interpreting the increase in our TFP index exclusively as a decline in transportation 
costs. If falling transportation costs alone were to explain all the growth of our index of TFP, then 
the rate of change of TFP would seem higher away from Paris. It would be on the distant properties 
that local prices would rise the most, and rents would follow in their wake. We would therefore 
expect to measure higher rates of TFP growth on distant properties and hence a positive coefficient 
for the logarithm of the distance to Paris in the regressions with the rate of change of TFP (Table 3, 
regression 2). Yet such was not the case. The coefficient is negative, and while transportation was 
growing more efficient, farming did the same. 
5. Explaining productivity growth
What then explains the slow growth in TFP that we see in the years 1650- 1 750 or the rapid 
increases we observed in the sixteenth century, in the early seventeenth century, and then again after 
1 775? Part of the growth during the years 1 650- 1 750 reflected improved transportation, while the 
surge in the early seventeenth century marked a recovery after the Wars of Religion. But what of the 
--------rrHl<>1e.,.11p"e"'1-ffiiou-s----of-rapid g1owt11? T11e answe1 does not lie with a social or technological 1evolution, fut 
nothing of the kind happened before 1 789. No wave of enclosures depopulated the countryside, and 
no mechanical revolution or drastic change of crops transformed farming, even at the end of the 
eighteenth century. What change there was probably reflected the opportunities made possible by the 
proximity of Paris and its growing market. The evidence thus fits the story, told by several historians, 
49 For the regressions with alternative shares and prices, see appendices 6 and 9. In Table 2, the 
level of TFP includes a correction for taxes, but in Table 3 the TFP growth rate does not. The 
coefficients in Table 3 will not be affected by the failure to correct for taxes, because the growth rate 
of taxes relative to rents appears among the explanatory variables. See appendix 1 3  for an 
explanation. The TFP growth rate regressions also include a dummy variable for ongoing repairs and 
for tenants who repeat from previous leases, which corrects for any market power that repeat tenants 
may have exercised. Finally, although one might argue for regressing nominal rents on prices and 
wages, the regressions swiftly bog down in multicollinearity, and in any event it is not uncommon to 
regress productivity indexes on explanatory variables. For an example, see Allen, "Efficiency." 
50 One cause for worry is the large value of the condition number, a sign of multicollinearity. 
Although multicollinearity may therefore cast some doubt upon the results with ln(TFP), it does not 
afflict the regression with the TFP growth rate, which point to the same dip in 1 589-97 and to the 
same sharp increase after 1 775 (Table 3 ,  regression 2). According to the coefficients, the TFP growth 
rate fell 2.4 percentage points in 1 589-97 and soared I point after 1 775. And everything else in the
regression fits our story too. For the condition number and multicollinearity, see George G. Judge 
et al, The Theory and Practice of Econometrics, 2nd edition (New York, 1 985), pp. 896-904. The 
sampie of leases showed no signs of heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation; for details, see Hoffn1an, 
SSWP 742, p. 1 7. 
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that stresses urban markets in explaining agricultural performance before the technological upheavals 
of the late nineteenth century. 
In the Paris region, where a large and growing market lay next door, we can begin to discern 
how agriculture benefitted from proximity to the city and from the resultant opportunities for trade 
that transportation costs ruled out in less urbanized regions. The higher productivity of farming near 
Paris did not necessarily stem from dramatically higher yields--evidence about the evolution of yields 
in the Paris region is in any case unclear--but we know that it was at least in part a response to the 
increasing animal population in the city. The horses that pulled the newly invented carriages of the 
privileged and brought food to the officials of the growing state drove up the price of forage and 
encouraged the production of additional animal feed on grain farms close to the city. Early on 
farmers planted artificial meadows to nourish their own livestock and then carted their oats, straw, 
and hay to Paris. They might then return with loads of manure to spread on their fields, releasing 
them from the terrible constraint that the lack of fertilizer imposed on traditional agriculture and 
boosting their grain yields. These changes all tended to be piecemeal and they were all accomplished 
on a small scale--in the corner of a field here, on a parcel of land there--rather than on entire farms. 
They thus did not upset the agricultural technology. Nonetheless, they sufficed to push TFP 
upward.s1 
The regressions substantiate the important role played by proximity to Paris and by the city's 
growth. Multicollinearity precludes adding the population of Paris to the regressions with the 
logarithm of TFP, but the growth rate of the urban population appears to have a large effect on the 
growth rate of TFP (Table 3, regression 2). In the early seventeenth century, for example, when the 
population of Paris was gaining 1 .3 percent annually--rapid growth by contemporary standards--it 
added 0.3 percent to the rate of increase of TFP, a large amount in the early modern world.52 One 
cannot rule out influence in the reverse direction--rising TFP making possible a larger urban 
population--but the evidence is at least consistent with the city's being a motor of agricultural growth. 
Small farm size has been invoked to explain the failings of French agriculture ever since the 
-------4a'ys--ef-Arthur Young, and it would be worth knowing "'hether farm siz�GRsolidation al't'ecte"'d----­
TFP growth in the Paris area. Large size (as measured by the logarithm of property area) actually 
diminishes rent and thus our measure of TFP, but the effect, we have argued, is merely the risk 
premium demanded of small scale tenants (Table 2, regressions 1 and 2). If we add to the regression 
a somewhat crude measure of consolidation (the logarithm of the number of hectares per property 
parcel), it does seem to boost the level of TFP, but the coefficient could be an artifact of 
multicollinearity (Table 2, regression 3).  More convincing perhaps are growth rate regressions, where 
multicollinearity poses no problems. There, neither the size of the property nor its consolidation 
seems to affect TFP's advance (Table 3, regressions 2 and 3). 
Yet we must be careful here. All that the growth rate regressions really imply is that no long­
run obstacles blocked the enlargement or the amalgamation of properties. To understand why, we 
must realize that properties were frequently consolidated by tenants who rented land from different 
landlords. Although the properties were distinct, the tenant operated them together. When Andre-
51 The previous two paragraphs depend upon Jean-Michel Chevet, "Le Marquisat d'Ormesson, 
1 700- 1 840: Essai d'analyse economique," 2 vols. (Doctoral Dissertation, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en 
Sciences Sociales, 1 983); George Grantham, "The Diffusion of the New Husbandry in Northern 
France, 1 8 1 5- 1 840," Journal of Economic History 38( 1 978): 3 1 1 -37; idem, "Agricultural Supply"; 
Jacquart, La crise rurale, pp. 32 1 -330; Meuvret, Subsistences; and forthcoming work by Jean-Marc 
Mori9eau and Gilles Postel-Vinay. That soil quality has no effect on rent or on TFP (Table 2, 
regressions 1 and 2) is consistent with this story: near Paris enough manure was available to make up 
for soil differences. 
52 Urban grow·th rates: Jan de Viies, European Urbanization. 1 500� 1 800 (Cambridge, r-.1ass.; 
1984 ). 
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Paul Hanoteau and his wife leased Notre Dame's 30-hectare property in Le-Tremblay-les-Gonesse 
in I 784, for example, it was not all the land they farmed. Indeed, they worked a total of several
hundred hectares in Le Tremblay-les-Gonesse and its environs.53 In the eighteenth century such 
arrangements--known as cumul de baux--grew increasingly common and seemed to capture 
economies of scale. The practice allowed a tenant to economize on buildings, equipment, and certain 
tasks.54 And it permitted him to spread his skills as an overseer--an important part of early modern 
farming--over multiple properties. 
Notre Dame had so much land that it could occasionally effect a consolidation by leasing two 
of its own properties to the same tenant. When we examine such consolidations, we find some failures 
but also some striking successes, as in La-Grande-Paroisse in the early seventeenth century, where 
TFP gained 6 percent. 55 Further evidence emerges from surviving rural tax rolls, which by the late 
eighteenth century routinely carried information about the total acreage a tenant farmed. Taxes were 
generally paid by tenants, rather than by absentee landlords, and the tax assessments in any given year 
turn out to be very nearly proportional to the total acreage the tenant worked. The assessments can 
thus serve as a proxy for the amount of land under the tenant's direction. If we compare various 
tenants' tax assessments for two fixed periods, change in the assessments will then give a relative 
measure of the increases in the scale of their farming operations. To be sure, the overall tax rate will 
have changed over the intervening period, but the assessment increase will still yield a relative 
measure of how much more land a tenant farmed. If he takes on additional hectares, his assessment 
will rise faster than the tax rate. If not, the assessment will merely keep pace with the tax rate. 
Being able to rely upon the changes in tax assessments as a proxy for changes in farm scale 
lets us use the tax rolls from the I 740s, when, at least near Paris, taxes still seemed proportional to
the area a tenant farmed, even though the areas themselves rarely appeared on the rolls. For a small 
number of properties we can find tenants' assessments both in 1 740-41  and in 1 783-89. If we plot 
how much the tax assessment changed for each property between 1 740-41  and 1 783-89 on a 
logarithmic scale versus how much the logarithm of TFP changed for the same property over the same 
-------ip"'e"'r<ti<Tec!d�, - ' :ati-0-n-and TEP stands out clearly, e_'i_=-----
though we are dealing with only seven properties (Figure 4). 56 
53 Hanoteau died in I 785 and according to the tax roll of that year he farmed 224 hectares.
Records of his estate suggest that he farmed even more--some 400 hectares. I thank Gilles Postel­
Vinay and Jean-Marc Moriceau for furnishing this information. 
54 In the eighteenth century, Notre Dame wanted to suppress the buildings on properties no 
longer large enough to be economical farms: AN LL 332 ( 1 76 1 -62, Larchant); S 320 (26-6- 1 780, 
Lizy-sur-Ourcq). One sign of the greater frequency of cumul de baux that the leases began to carry 
a clause acknowledging it: AN S324A (Le-Mesnil-Amelot, 25-6- 1 7 8 1 ), S 407 (Viercy, 25-8- 1 785). 
For early consolidation, see Jacquart, Crise rurale, pp. 340-48, and for an excellent example, see the 
forthcoming book by Postel-Vinay and Moriceau. 
55 AN LL 329-30, S 272, S 273 ( 1 636-54). 
56 For the tax rolls, see Jean Guerout, ed., Roles de la taille de !'election de Paris conserves aux 
Archives nationales (sous series Z J G) et dans !es archives departementales (Paris, 1 9 8 1 ) .  A search 
at the AN turned up tax assessments for 44 tenants in the series Z JG,  and these assessments bore out 
the close relationship between the size of the assessment and the number of hectares the tenant 
farmed. Tax assessments may have been misleading in earlier periods and in other regions, but here 
they seem a reliable guide to the acreage farmed. For only seven of the properties, however, was I 
able to get leases and useable tax assessments in both 1 740-4 1 and 1 7 83-89. When more than one tax 
assessment was avaiiable for a property in 1 740-4 1 or in 1 783�89, I averaged the logarithm of the
different assessments· for each period. There is no tax correction in Figure 4; for an explanation, see 
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Again, the overall tax rate per hectare had shifted between 1 740-41  and 1 783-89, but the 
change in taxes for a given property still yields a relative measure of how much more land the later 
tenant farmed. In Le-Tremblay-les-Gonesse, for example, the scale of the tenant's operation grew 
appreciably between 1 740-4 1  and 1 783-89. Until 1 74 1 ,  a struggling Mathieu Bignon had been 
farming Notre Dame's property in Le-Tremblay, along with roughly 30 hectares of his own. But by 
the early 1 780s, we know, the property was farmed by Andre-Paul Hanoteau, who worked much more 
land. The increased acreage had boosted the tenant's taille assessment in the intervening years, and 
the TFP of the property marched in step, climbing 14  percent. 57 
Apparently, amalgamation via cumul de baux did increase productivity, evidence that farm 
size mattered. The fact that our measures of property size and of property consolidation had no 
noticeable positive effect in the regressions merely implies that the amalgamation of properties 
encountered few obstacles, at least in the eighteenth century. Otherwise, the large properties, in 
effect already consolidated, would have enjoyed a great advantage, and the coefficients of property 
size and property consolidation would be large and positive in our TFP growth rate regressions. To 
operate a larger farm, tenants simply amalgamated properties and did so without difficulty, so that 
the distribution of the true farm size was independent of the distribution of property size. Under 
such conditions, property size would not be expected to play a significant role in the TFP regressions 
even if there were increasing returns to scale in farming. 
Size and consolidation thus mattered, but near Paris at least there were few obstacles to 
achieving the appropriate scale. Perhaps this scale increased over time, particularly in the eighteenth 
century. It is true that attempts to amalgamate properties before the eighteenth century had often 
failed. Perhaps the skills needed to run a large farm had been scarce in the earlier centuries, when 
few farmers could mobilize the necessary capital or keep the requisite farm accounts. 
Weighing the various factors that boosted TFP is treacherous, but we can at least advance some 
crude guesses for the eighteenth century. Between 1 725-49 and 1 775-89, TFP climbed roughly 9 
percent, if we compute TFP with the Bernonville shares and with prices averaged over the outgoing 
ease. Pe1haps I pe1cent-derived-from-imprn,ing trafiSJ)6ftation, leaving 8 !JereenHhatt<>ef'f!ft'e"'e"'tee.dHthi.,e.-----­
growth of agricultural outputs relative to the factors of production. 
Total land and livestock use seem not to have changed appreciably, but the farm accounts 
analyzed by Postel-Vinay and Moriceau suggest that the amount of agricultural labor employed fell 
by about 6 percent between 1 725-49 and 1 7 75-89, probably because of farm amalgamation. The 6 
percent drop would account for a 2-percent TFP gain. As for outputs, animal products in all 
likelihood remained static, but the evolution of grain yields is uncertain. On the one hand, Jean 
Meuvret and others have suggested that there was no increase in yields near Paris in the eighteenth 
century and hence no role for grain output in the growth of TFP. On the other, George Grantham 
has proposed a 1 5-percent rise in wheat yields between 1 750 and 1 800, which translates into a 6 
percent TFP gain over our period. Grantham's estimate fits the numbers proposed by other recent 
scholars, and if we accept it, then together with the decline in the use of labor, we can account for 
appendix 1 3. Figure 4 here differs slightly from an analogous graph in Hoffman, SSWP 742, because 
of the addition of new data. 
57 AN Z J G  291 B  ( 1 740), 292B ( 1 74 1 ), 4 3 1 A  ( 1 786), and 45 1B  ( 1 789). Hanoteau died in 1 785, 
forcing me to use his widow's tax assessment for 1 786 and 1 789; using his own assessment for 1 785 
would not have changed matters appreciably. As with all the properties, the change in ln(TFP) here 
was computed between the years 1 732-45 and 1 777-89. Such long periods had to be chosen because 
of the volatiiity of rent payn1ents and because the leases in force in the years 1 740-41  and 1 783-89
had been drawn up as early as 1 732 and 1 777.  
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nearly all the progress of TFP. 58 
Whatever the causes, it is in any case clear that Old-Regime agriculture was capable of 
astonishing growth, at least near Paris. Admittedly, the region was the most commercialized part of 
the kingdom, and no other French city could generate the same opportunities for trade. And the 
innovations that spurred on productivity growth--among them the planting of artificial meadows and 
the consolidation of properties--faced fewer hurdles in the Paris region than they did elsewhere. 
Nonetheless, the performance of agriculture near Paris was still stunning. As early as the sixteenth 
century, local farmers outdid their English counterparts at the task of economic growth, and the 
progress they achieved was particularly dramatic in the late eighteenth century--not what is usually 
expected on the eve of the Revolution. 
The problem was that the French could not sustain their productivity increases. Their gains 
in the early sixteenth century were dashed in the Wars of Religion; their recovery in the early 
seventeenth century, sapped by military taxes and the Fronde. In the end, agriculture near Paris 
suffered grievously from these setbacks. While in the English Midlands farmers maintained 
productivity growth rates of 0.2 to 0.3 percent over a full two centuries, in the Paris Basin they 
managed only 0. 1  or perhaps 0.2 percent over the long haul. They could push their farms at better 
than 0.3 percent for 50 or even 75 years, but a crisis would soon cut short their advances.59 In the 
end, it took them three centuries to accomplish what the English did in two. Their productivity, it 
appears, was hardly static and unchanging; indeed, it proved all too flighty. It moved up and down, 
dancing to a rhythm set by a variety of forces. Among them we must count not only the opportunities 
for trade on the outskirts of a large city but the baleful consequences of war. 
58 Postel-Vinay and Moriceau, [forthcoming]; Meuvret, Subsistences, vol. I ,  pt. 1 : 1 94-203; George
Grantham, "The Growth of Labour Productivity in the 'Cinq Grosses Fermes' of France, 1 750- 1 933," 
in Bruce Campbell and Mark Overton, eds., Productivity Change and Agricultural Development 
(Manchester, forthcoming). Chevet, "Le Marquisat d'Ormesson," proposes even larger yield increases 
than Grantham. 
59 Figures for the Midlands are derived from Allen, "The Growth of Labor Productivity." TFP 
in the rviidlands advanced perhaps 30 to 60 percent between 1 600 and 1 800. In the Paris Basin it took 
a century longer--from 1 500 to 1 789--to grow as much. 
2 1  
Appendices 
I. Treatment of Leases
Early modern leases bristle with complications, making even the payment of rent an intricate 
matter. Consider, for example, the lease which the cathedral of Notre Dame and its tenant, Pierre 
Landry, agreed to in 1 7 8 1 .  Landry was to continue operating Notre Dame's 95-hectare farm in 
Mesnil-Amelot for another 9 years and to pay an annual rent of 1 200 livres in cash plus 2 1 6  Paris 
setiers (roughly a 1 000 bushels) of wheat. The wheat had to be cleaned, ready for market, and 
delivered to the cathedral in Paris. Alternatively, Notre Dame could demand cash in place of the 
wheat. In that event, the wheat was to be evaluated at 5 sous per setier below the Paris price for the 
best quality wheat on the feast of Saint Martin (November 1 1 ), the date when the grain was to be 
delivered; the 5 sous per setier amounted to about a I percent discount below the maximum Saint­
Martin price. In addition to the wheat, Landry was to deliver 200 bottes of straw to the cathedral in 
Paris or to pay cash in place of straw, with the straw evaluated via the Paris market price on the date 
of delivery. Landry had a number of other obligations as well--tending to upkeep, for example--and 
at the beginning of the new lease he was to pay a one-time entry fine amounting to 1 0  percent of the 
first year's rent.60 
There are further complexities in Landry's lease, but these details suffice to sketch the 
complexities of the rent payments involved. As with Landry, Notre Dame's other tenants might owe 
the cathedral annual rent in cash, in-kind payments, pots-de-vin (entry fines, almost always equal 
to a one-time payment of ten percent of the first year's rent), or charges (obligations to make cash 
or in-kind payments for Notre Dame--to a local priest, for example). I spread the pots-de-vin evenly 
over the life of the lease (without discounting) and converted the in-kind payments into cash. If the 
in-kind payments entailed delivering grain to Paris (the usual case), they were evaluated using the 
��iee OR the-feasts of Saint Martin over the eourse ol'--Ehe-outgoing lease (i.e., the 
current feast of Saint Martin and the eight previous ones). I chose prices on the feast of Saint Martin 
because contemporaries used them to evaluate in-kind payments and because grain was typically due 
then. For wheat and rye, minimum Saint Martin prices were used since Notre Dame expected the 
grain to fetch a price slightly less than the best quality wheat and rye. For the oats and barley only 
maximum prices were available, but most in-kind payments involved wheat. 
Before 1 520 and after 1 698, the Saint Martin wheat prices in Paris ceased being available, so 
I used a proxy constructed by first regressing the Saint-Martin wheat prices on the annual Paris wheat 
price for the years 1 520- 1 698. The regression was performed without an intercept term, and for the 
years before 1 520 and after 1698, when the annual Paris price existed but the Saint Martin price did 
not, I simply multiplied the annual Paris price by the regression coefficient to get the proxy. Saint 
Martin prices were also lacking for the other grains before 1 520 and after 1 698, which necessitated 
similar proxies. For rye I regressed Paris Saint Martin rye prices on the annual Paris wheat price 
without an intercept term in the regression; I then used the regression coefficient to create a rye proxy 
for the years before 1 520 and after 1 698. For barley and oats, I simply resorted to 25-year average 
prices when the Saint-Martin prices were unavailable. 
Grain delivered outside of Paris and other in-kind payments--usually very small--were 
evaluated using cash equivalents found in late eighteenth-century leases. Ideally, one would prefer 
to evaluate them by multiplying the quantities due by the appropriate local market prices, but the 
local prices series--say the price of wine in a small market town--might be lacking for a number of 
years. What I did therefore was to project the late eighteenth-century cash equivalents back into the 
past using long term trends in Paris prices. I relied upon 25-year average prices of the items 
concerned. A quantity of wine delivered to a village priest and worth 1 0  livres in 1 750-74, for 
60 AN S 324A, 25 June 1 78 1 .  
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example, I assumed to be worth !Oh in 1650-74, where h was the ratio of the 1650-75 Paris price for 
wine to the 1750-74 Paris price. If the Paris price and the local market price diverged, this method 
would involve some error, but the error would in any event be minuscule, for most in-kind payments 
involved wheat delivered to Paris. 
I made one change in the procedure for evaluating in-kind payments when experimenting 
with alternate prices in the agricultural price-cost index. When I averaged the prices and the wages 
in the index over the new lease (in other words, over the current year and eight years into the future), 
I evaluated all in-kind payments over the life of the new lease too, instead of over the previous lease. 
I modified the procedure in an analogous way when I experimented with other prices and wages in 
the price-cost index. 
One might wonder, of course, whether the results were sensitive to the way I evaluated the 
in-kind payments, but this seems not to have been the case. Regressions with those leases in which 
all the payments were in cash differed little from regressions that included the in-kind leases, except 
for a higher R 2. The reason for the higher R 2 with the cash-only leases was that the value of grain 
payments was volatile and added considerable noise to the dependent variable in the regressions. 
One occasional complication with early modern French leases was the practice of using contre 
lettres: private letters attached to the leases that revised lease terms. Like other landlords, Notre Dame 
employed contre lettres, but only for minor matters, and unlike many landlords, Notre Dame never 
used them to disguise the true rent. In the hands of other landlords, contre lettres often served to 
reduce the tax assessments of large scale tenants, whose tax assessments were based on the artificially 
low rent in their leases, not the actual rent in the contre lettres. Notre Dame, though, never resorted 
to such practices. The reason, apparently, was that operating a large farm for Notre Dame typically 
involved paying sizable charges--typically to the local parish priest. Since these charges did not 
figure in the tax assessments either, the large scale tenants of Notre Dame enjoyed an automatic tax 
reduction equivalent to that gained by other landlords via contre lettres. 
In addition to farm land, the Notre Dame leases might also involve rights to collect the tithe 
-------<Qr seigniorial dues on property other than the land that was to be cultivated. Since these rights did
not pertain to the operation of the farm, I subtracted their value from the lease. I determined their 
value from cash equivalents given in the late eighteenth century, suitably adjusted for changing 
prices. For none of the properties were such tithe rights or seigniorial dues large. If they or the 
property area changed by a significant amount (for example, more than a 1 4-percent change in the 
property area), I assumed that I was dealing with a different property and began a new time series. 
2. Distance as a Proxy for the Cost of Transportation to Paris
The regressions use the logarithm of the distance to Paris as a proxy for the logarithm of the 
cost of transporting crops to Paris. Ideally, one would prefer the actual cost of shipping by the 
cheapest means available--overland for properties close to Paris, and by river for more distant 
properties, where the economies of river transport overtook the added costs of shipping crops to a 
river port and then loading them on boats. For our properties, though, evidence from the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries suggests that the shipping costs were highly correlated with simple distance 
from Paris.61 Indeed, if one figures the ·cost of shipping to Paris via the cheapest means for the
properties in our sample, then the logarithm of the cost is almost perfectly correlated with the 
logarithm of distance from Paris (r =0.99), and the correlation does not seem sensitive to errors in the 
shipping cost figures. Using distance from Paris rather than shipping costs therefore seems 
justifiable. 
3. Quality Adjustments and Rent Averages
61 Information on the cost of transportation was taken from Meuvret, Subsistances� vol. 1 :  pt. 1 
(Texte): 53-58; pt. 2 (Notes):2 1 -23, 58-62. 
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The quality adjustment that I employed is discussed in the text; it had a minor effect on the 
rent (Figure A- 1 ). The same held for other quality adjustments that I tried, all based on regressions 
with ln(rent). These other adjustments included running regressions with a dummy variable for each 
property; using locational and land quality characteristics only, but no time dependent variables; and 
replacing the time trend with an agricultural price-cost ratio. All gave nearly identical results. 
The area-weighted average over all leases in force assumes that each lease lasted nine-years 
or until renewed and that rents remained constant in the interim. Table 1 ,  column 3 calculates such 
an average, relying on the same regression for the quality adjustment but weighting each lease by the 
property area. The overall trend with this average over the leases in force is similar to that obtained 
with the average over the newly signed leases, but there are some differences (Figure A - 1 ). When 
the fighting during the League ravaged the Paris Basin in the 1 590s, for example, ln(rent) fell for the 
leases signed in the decade (Table l ,  column 4). If we average over all leases in force, though, the 
logarithm, buoyed up by leases signed in the previous decade, actually increases. The increase, 
however, is illusory, since many of the older leases were in fact no longer in force: tenants had fled 
before the warring armies, farms lay in ruin, and no one was actually paying rent.62 Although the 
difference between the two methods is generally small, the average over the sample leases--the ones 
signed during the decade--seems a bit closer to reality. 
The same holds in the eighteenth century, when rents are increasing. The average over all the 
leases in force may do a better job of representing the income landlords received, but it lags slightly 
behind the true rental value of the land. The average over the leases signed in a decade--the sample 
leases--does not. Between the 1 730s and the 1 780s, for instance, nominal rents adjusted for quality 
rise only 73 percent if we average over all leases in force (Table l ,  column 3). If we average over the 
sample leases--those signed during the two decades--the increase is much larger: 105 percent (Table 
1 ,  column 2). The 1 05-percent jump lies in the very center of the range of figures that other 
historians have unearthed for the Paris Basin: a 79 to 1 20-percent gain between the 1 730s and the 
1 780s. The close fit with other research argues in favor of using the average over the sample leases, 
------�M1tiea1Mly sinee we are interested not the landlord's ineeme llut in true rental value.63 
4. The Comparison with the Veyrassat-Herren and Le Roy Ladurie Rent Series
Veyrassat-Herren and Le Roy Ladurie published 5-year averages of an index of deflated rent. 
To deflate, they divided nominal rents by a 13-year moving average wheat price, centered on year 
five of each lease. To reverse their steps, I multiplied their figures by the average wheat price over 
each 5-year period of a 1 3-year moving average centered 5 years in the future. I also assumed that 
they had used their used their raw wheat price series as it was originally published, without 
corrections for typographical errors or for the changing size of the setier. Other ways of comparing 
their rent series and my own, such as subjecting my series to their deflation procedure, led to similar 
results. 
5. Formulas for TFP and Technical Assumptions
Assume the farmer produces outputs y1, . . .  ,ym using factors of production x1, ... ,xn, where x1 
is land. If the outputs can be sold at prices p1 , . . .  ,pm and the factors of production bought at prices 
w1, . . .  ,wn, then the farmer's profit is 
62 See, for example, AN LL 329-30 (La Grande Paroisse, 1 594); LL332 (Larchant, 1 596); LL34 1 -
42 (Rungis, 1 588); and S 242 (Dampmart, 1 597). 
63 B6aur, rvrarche foncier, pp. 262-68; Veyrassat-Herren and Ladurie, "La rente fonciere11; 
Bertrandy-Lacabane, Bretigny-sur-Orge, pp.3 1 4- 1 5 . 
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Although some of the farmer's transactions may have taken place outside the market, we assume that 
he was at least partially involved in the product and factor markets, so that the prices in (3) are 
market prices. 
If the land and rental market is competitive with free entry and if rents are revised frequently, 
then the farmer's profits will be driven down to zero: they will all go to the landlord. Therefore, 
m • 
II = LP;Y, - Ew;:. = O i=l j=l J 
(4) 
Differentiating the left hand side of (4) with respect to time and regrouping all the terms, we obtain 
m dy. n dx. n d:w. m dp. f;p -' - f:w.-1 
= L -1x. - E-'y. 
i=l I dt I=1 1 dt j=l dt 1 i=l dt I
Dividing through by total revenue or cost R, where 
yields 
• f:w;:. 
j=l } 
(5) 
(6)  
(7) 
where the ui = piy/R are output shares in total revenue, the vi = wix/R are factor shares in total cost,------�a.,n"'d'"-'tuhce_,,d,..o,.t,,,s_.r_efer to rates of growth (i e tjme derivatives o[ the logarithm) The expression on the 
left of (7) is the growth rate of TFP, the rate at which outputs are growing less the rate at which 
inputs are increasing, suitably weighted by output and factor shares. Equation (7) simply allows us 
to calculate the growth rate of TFP using prices instead of quantities, and it is the basis for the 
calculations of the growth rate of TFP in Figure A-3 and Tables 3 and A-2. 
So far we have only assumed that markets exist and that one of the markets, the land rental 
market, is competitive and open to entry. This assumption allows us to set the farmer's profits equal 
to zero and makes the tenant's compensation no more than he would earn in the labor market. 
Although such a treatment of the farmer's profits is obviously open to question- -a subject to which 
we shall return below--it is common in the agricultural productivity literature.64 
If product and factor shares are constant, then by integrating the right hand side of (7) we 
have that 
v1 v., 
TFP = 
w, ... w. = (r + t)' c
"1 "• p Pi "'Pm 
(8) 
Here r is per-hectare rent, t is per-hectare taxes, s = v1 is the factor share of land, and we have made 
the reasonable assumption that the burden of taxation falls on land so that w 1 = r + t. The variables 
64 For an example, see Robert E Evenson and Hans P. Binswanger, "Estimating Labor Demand 
Functions for Indian Agriculture," in Contractual Arrangements. Employment. and Wages in Rural 
Labor Markets in Asia, ed. Hans P. Binswanger and Mark R. Rosenzweig (New Haven, 1984). Cf. 
the criticisms in G. R. E. Lopez, "Estimating Substitution and Expansion Effects Using a Piofit 
Function Framework," American Journal of Agricultural Economics 66(1984):358-67. 
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C and P are indexes of agricultural costs and prices, given by 
As a result, 
ln(TFP) = s ln(r + t) - In( p) c 
(9) 
(10)
Equation (10)  serves as the basis for calculating ln(TFP) in Tables 2 and A-1  and in Figures 3,  4, and 
A-4. 
So far we have not invoked cost minimization or profit maximization, although without some 
optimizing behavior, our measure of TFP is simply a definition, with no necessary connection to the 
agricultural technology. We do have to assume the existence of a large number of risk neutral tenants 
for the tenant farmer's profits to be driven down to zero as in (4), and risk neutrality is not far from 
profit maximization. Profit maximization is in any case hardly an unreasonable assumption for the 
large scale tenants who operated farms in the Paris Basin: they owned considerable capital and had 
chosen to pay a fixed rent rather than to work for a wage. 
If we do assume profit maximization, and if (as seems to have been the case) all the product 
and factor markets are competitive--not just the rental market--then we can demonstrate that the 
growth rate of TFP is in fact the rate of technical change. Let us suppose that our farmer takes all 
the prices wj and P; as given and that the inputs and outputs are linked via a transformation function 
F with F(x1, .. .,xn,y1, . . .  ,ym,t) = 0.65 Here F depends on time t because of technical change. If thetechnology is well behaved, we can use the implicit function theorem to solve for one output (say y1)in terms of x1, . . .  ,xn,y2, . . .  ,ym,t, so that at least locally
( 1 1 )  
Differentiating (11) with 1espect to 
ay, Of ax, - = -- +
tit ax, tit 
(12)  
To avoid problems in the case of  constant returns to  scale, let us  suppose as well that in the 
short run the farmer takes the supply of land x1 as a fixed input--say over the course of a lease--and that he maximizes short run profits.66 Short run profit maximization then implies that 
Of = Wj j = 2, ... ,n Pi a 
"; 
( 13)  
and 
Of 
Pi ay, -pi i = 2, ... ,m (14) 
65 For the necessary assumptions, see Chambers, Applied Production Analysis, pp. 260-6 1 .  
Except for the land rental market, all the other price and factor markets had so many actors that 
competition seems very reasonable. 
66 Alternatively, if the technology does not exhibit constant returns to scale, then we can let the 
amount of land vary in the short run and allow the farmer to maximize long run profits. We will in 
any case end up with the sarrie identity between TFP and technical change. \Ve need not assume, it 
is worth stressing, that the supply of land is fixed. 
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We can also characterize the partial derivative of f with respect to land x1. Over the long runx1 may vary, but the competitive rental market assures that the landlord will absorb any profits fromrenting additional land. A simple application of the envelope theorem then yields 
p,.3L = w,ax, ( 15) 
If we use ( 1 5) and the first order conditions for profit maximization to express the partial derivatives 
of f in terms of prices, then ( 1 2) becomes 
dy1 w1 dx1 W, dx, P2 dy2 Pm dym 0/ - = -- + ... + - - - -- - ... - - - + -
dt p1 dt p1 dt p1 dt p1 dt ilt 
Multiplying both sides by p1/R, where R is total revenue, yields
n - Evj = uj 
j=l J 
where 
i = _iln(f) 
ilt 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
The expression on the left of ( 17) is  the growth rate of TFP; the expression on the right is the rate 
of technical change, the rate (in percentage terms) at which the production function f is shifting, 
adjusted for the relative importance of the output y1. With only one output, for example, u1 = I  andthe growth rate of TFP equals the partial derivative of ln(f) with respect to time. Note that this result 
does not depend on factor and product shares being constant. 
_________ ___Lln"--'t.ub.,e_.c.,_o""nut.,e,,.x.1._tJJou..f-1P.LJ.'rafit maximization, the assumption of constant product and factor shares
amounts to a choice of the form of the profit function. The particular form implied by the constant 
shares assumption is only a local first order approximation to an arbitrary profit function. Obviously, 
functional forms capable of providing a local second order approximation (so called flexible 
functional forms, such as a translog or a generalized Leontief) would be preferable, but the data 
needed to estimate such profit functions and thereby determine TFP is unfortunately unavailable, for 
the estimation requires information on both prices and quantities. As is shown in appendix 1 1 , 
though, the loss of accuracy is minimal, at least in the one instance where we have the information 
to check it. 67 
6. Product and Factor Shares and the Rental Price of Agricultural Capital
67 For the form of the profit function with constant shares, see Allen, "Efficiency and 
Distributional Consequences." On multi-output profit functions, see Chambers, Applied Production 
Analysis, pp. 268 - 8 1 ;  Lawrence J. Lau, "Applications of Profit Functions," in Melvyn Fuss and 
Danield McFadden, eds., Production Economics: A Dual Approach to Theory and Applications, 2 
vols. (Amsterdam, 1978), 1 : 1 33-3 10; W. E. Diewert, "Applications of Duality Theory," in Michael D. 
lntriligator and David A. Kendrick, eds., Frontiers of Quantitative Economics, vol. 2 (Amsterdam, 
1 974), pp. I 07-7 1 .  In practice it is easier to estimate demand equations derived from profit functions
rather than the profit function directly; for examples, see Lopez, "Estimating Substitution and 
Expansion," and Evenson and Binswanger, "Estimating Labor Demand Functions for Indian 
Agriculture." Appendix 1 1  takes up the issue of superlative index numbers--another way to calculate 
TFP and one equivaient to the use of fiexibie functional forms--but they too require inforn1ation on
quantities. 
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The product and factor shares used to calculate TFP were taken from accounts of the farm 
of Bernonville, part of the village now known as Aisonville-Bernoville near Guise in the department 
of the Aisne. The Bernonville accounts for the year 1 765 were analyzed (along with those of a 
number of other farms) in Charles Rebeyrol, De la grande et de la petite culture chez Jes phvsiocrates 
(Paris, 19 12), pp. 35-44. Rebeyrol relied upon evidence published in 1767 in the Ephemerides du 
citoyen, a journal that, though polemical, was known for publishing reliable information concerning 
matters such as farm budgets.68 
Supplemental information and evidence concerning farms elsewhere in the Paris Basin were 
gleaned from Alexandre-Henri Tessier et al, Encyclopedie methodique ou par ordre de matieres: 
Agriculture 7 vols. (Paris, 1787-1821  ); M. Jouvencel, Modele de bail a cheptel pour servir 
d'instruction aux proprietaireS OU capitalistes qui voudront etablir des troupeaux de betes a laine dans
!es fermes des environs de Paris (Versaille, 1 8 1 0); S. Hassenfratz, "Memoire sur la comparaison des 
produits de la culture du Bourbonnais avec celle de la Picardie," Memoires d'agriculture. d'economie 
rurale et domestique ( 1 786), pp. 105-22; Jacquart, Crise rurale, pp. 289-408; Emile Mireaux, Une 
province francaise au temps du grand roi: La Brie (Paris, 1958), pp. 97- 1 64, 322-41 ;  Meuvret, 
Subsistences, vol. l ;  and forthcoming work by Gilles Postel-Vinay and J. M. Moriceau. All of these 
sources are the work either of eighteenth-century experts or of modern authorities and they all draw 
upon evidence from actual early modern farms. 
The Bernonville factor shares were: land, 0.267; labor, including in-kind compensation and 
labor provided by the tenant farmer, 0.361; wheat seed, 0.058; rye seed, 0.009; barley seed, 0.007; oat 
seed and feed, 0. 109; bean and pea seed, 0.0 1 3; linseed, 0.004; horses, 0.044; cattle, 0.015; sheep, 
0.052; pigs, 0.01 1 ;  poultry, 0.0 13;  and equipment, 0.035. Product revenue shares were: wheat output, 
0.456; rye output, 0.080; barley output, 0.036; oats output, 0 . 10  I ;  bean and pea output, 0.073; flax
output, 0.05 1 ;  dairy output, 0.035; wool, 0.042; eggs, 0.0 1 5; beef, 0.0 1 2; mutton, 0.076; pork, 0.0 1 5; 
horses, 0.007. 
Here and throughout the paper, the shares for livestock and equipment were calculated using 
rental pnces, set equal to the sales pnce multiplied by depreciation plus interest. The clef)reciati&1t-----­
rates were derived from evidence concerning the useful life of animals and from costs for equipment 
replacement and upkeep; they were: horses, 0. 1 1 1; cows, 0. 1 33; sheep, 0.25; pigs and poultry, l ;  
equipment, 0.143.  The interest rates were the going rate on rentes.69 A comparison of land rental 
rates and land sales prices suggests that the rentes did reflect the going rate of interest in the 
countryside; so do rental contracts for milk cows. In the Brie in the 1660s, for example, rentes paid 
5 percent and cows were leased out at 17 percent of their value, to judge from the median of the 
rental contracts in AN S 471 .  Our depreciation rate for dairy cattle, from Tessier, sv "Betes a comes," 
is 1 3  percent. The price of cattle was appreciating at about 1 percent annually, so we get an implied 
interest rate of 1 7  - 1 3  + 1 = 5 percent, which is precisely the rente rate. Note that the rental cost of 
68 Andre J. Bourde, Agronomie et agronomes en France au XVIIIe siecle, 3 vols. (Paris, 1967), 
3: 1 5 1 3 - 1 4. 
69 Sources for the rente interest rates were as follows: Bernard Schnapper, Les rentes au XVIe 
siecle: Histoire d'un instrument de credit (Paris, 1 957), pp. 68-72, 100-02, 279; Pierre Gaubert, "Le 
tragique l 7e siecle," in Histoire economigue et sociale de la France, ed. F. Braudel and E. Labrousse, 
vol. 2 (Paris, 1970): 343-44; Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Les pavsans de Languedoc, 2 vols. (Paris, 
1966), 2: 1 024-25. The rates I used, which were medians for each 25-year periods, were as follows: 
0.0833 ( 1 500-99), 0.0625 ( 1 600-49), 0.05 ( 1650-99), 0.0455 ( 1 700-24), 0.03 ( 1 725-74), 0.0427 ( 1 775-
89). Except for Le Roy Ladurie, these were all rates from the Paris area, but the rates he gave (for 
Languedoc) tended to agree with the evidence in Schnapper and Goubert. Furthermore, all three 
sources yield rates that agree with those I have found in rural notarial archives from the Paris Basin, 
including AN S 468-69, 473-75 (La Grande Paroisse); Archives cteparten1entales [henceforth AD] des 
Yvelines et de l'ancien departement de Seine-et-Oise, E notaires (Bretigny-sur-Orge). 
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dairy cattle we would calculate for our cost index C (interest plus depreciation, or 1 8  percent of the 
price of a cow) was very close to the true rental cost of capital ( 1 7  percent of the price of a cow). 
Although one might have doubts about the robustness of the depreciation rates here, very 
similar rates seem to have applied to most early modern herds. Wilhelm Abel, for example, gives 
figures for medieval and early modern Germany that a imply a depreciation rate for dairy cattle of 
1 3  or 1 4  percent. 70 Since the depreciation rates for livestock and equipment exceeded the interest 
rate by a large margin after 1 600, the rental costs of capital we calculated were relatively insensitive 
to variations in the interest rate. 71 
Seed and feed prices equalled prices of the respective grains multiplied by 1 plus the interest 
rate because they had been stored for a year. Only net inputs and net outputs were considered, 
although we did assume the purchase of seed and oat feed. Products consumed on the farm in the 
form of in-kind wages were evaluated at market prices. 
To be sure, some of the product and factor shares from Bernonville might seem questionable. 
The shares for wheat output and for wheat seed imply a high seed-yield ratio, and the seed-yield ratio 
was indeed high in Bernonville--better than 8 to I. However, such seed-yield ratios were far from
unusual near Bernonville, where the soil was well suited for cereals. A careful investigation 
undertaken in the generalite of Soissons in 1 7 1 6  revealed seed-yield ratios reaching 1 0  or 1 2  to 1 in 
the vicinity of Bernonville (more precisely, in the subdelegation of Guise), and according to the same 
document, seed-yield ratios of 8 or more were not uncommon throughout the whole generalite. Such 
a seed-yield ratio, it should be stressed, did not necessarily imply a high wheat yield per hectare, 
because seeding rates varied greatly. Even the high seed-yield ratios of 1 0  or 1 2  to l near Bernonville 
meant yields of only 1 3  to l 5.6 hectoliters per hectare, well below the maximums observed in the Paris 
Basin in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.72 
One might also worry slightly about oat production on the Bernon ville farm. With the product 
shares of oats and the factor share of oat seed and feed nearly equal, the farm was essentially self 
sufficient in oats; it consumed too much to be a net exporter. Obviously, other farms in the Paris area 
------,e"X"'pmorrrrlt.,,ed-oats and had highet oat p1oduct sha1es. At Be111011ville, though, tJIB-stiff soils require 
somewhat larger number of plow horses, and the horses consumed oats that would otherwise have 
been exported. Fortunately, variations in the oat product share had little effect on the index of TFP, 
because the price of oats was highly correlated with other output prices. 73 The oat shares, in short, 
are no cause for worry. 
70 Wilhelm Abel, Geschichte der deutschen Landwirtschaft vom friihen Mittelalter bis zum 1 9. 
Jahrhundert, 3rd ed. (Stuttgart, 1 978), p. 26. 
71 For example, raising our interest rates to the legal maximum (they were generally a bit below 
the legal maximum) would have very little effect on the overall trend of TFP. If we recalculate the 
index of TFP using the legal maximum interest rates and normalize the resulting index to have the 
same value as the old index in the years l 750- 74, then our TFP figures would be almost uniformly 
2 percent lower for the years before 1 700, l percent lower in 1 700-24 and 1 775-89, and essentially 
unchanged in 1 725-74. In short, there would be slightly more productivity growth in 1 700-74 and 
slightly less after 1 775.  Otherwise the story would be the same. 
72 Meuvret, Subsjstances, vol. 1 ,  pt. 1 (Texte ): 196-97. 
73 In Hoffman, SSWP 742, I assumed that the Bernonville accounts were wrong and that the farm 
actually imported twice the quantity of oats shown in the accounts because of the large number of 
horses. I made this assumption despite the presence of artificial meadows on the farm, which should 
have sufficed to feed the farm livestock. Despite the large change in the factor share of oat feed, the 
TFP figures ren1ained practically unchanged. iviaking the farm a net exporter of oats would have an 
equally small effect on TFP. 
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In general, the technology of the Bernon ville farm resembled that found elsewhere in the Paris 
Basin, not just in the eighteenth century but in the seventeenth and sixteenth centuries as well. If we 
examine farms in the Beauce in 1 787, on the plains north of Paris in the 1 740s, in the Brie in the early 
eighteenth century, and in the Hurepoix south of Paris in the period 1 550- 1670, we find similar 
outputs and similar factors of production.74 Typically, between one quarter and one third of the 
arable land was devoted to winter grain; in Bernonville, the figure was 24 percent. The acreage 
devoted to spring grain on the other farms was about the same, though sometimes a bit higher; in 
Bernonville, it was 29 percent. Although the amount of artificial meadow on the Bernonville farm 
( 1 5  percent of the arable) was a bit higher than on the other farms, it was hardly unusual for the Paris 
Basin, and the amount of fallow (30 percent) was perfectly normal. 75 
Labor use on the Bernon ville farm was typical as well. If we consider for example the number 
of plowmen employed on farms in the Paris Basin, it turns out to have varied greatly, but the number 
in Bernonville was precisely in the middle of the range. On local farms, the number of plowman 
might range from 1 for every 30 hectares down to only l for every 60 hectares, if we assume that all 
plows listed in death inventories were used. The number also seemed to diminish over time. On the 
plains north of Paris, for example, it went from 1 for every 30 hectares circa 1 700 to l for every 50 
hectares by l 790. Using 1 plow for every 30 hectares was the average for death inventories in the 
Hurepoix in the period 1 550- 1 670, but in some of the inventories from the same period the number 
was as low as 1 for every 60 hectares. 76 In any event, in Bernonville the number of plowman was 
precisely in the middle of this wide range: 1 for every 43 hectares.77 
Harvest and temporary labor was also typical on the Bernonvil!e farm. Harvest labor for grain 
crops typically cost to 8 to 1 2  percent of their value in the seventeenth century, and if we add other 
related temporary labor, the figure would rise to about 1 6  percent, whether we look at evidence from 
the sixteenth, seventeenth, or eighteenth centuries. On the BernonviUe farm, the cost of harvest and 
related temporary labor was 1 8  percent of the grain harvest, very close to the 1 6  percent figure. 
Fina11y, the amount of agricultural capital on the Bernonville farm resembled what one found 
------�el"'s�e�wrltJ�e�r�e�ie.n�th,;,e�J>aris-Basin. The faun had 12 ho1ses--!)el'-Hl9--heetaf' , · 
north of Paris in the 1 740s, and a median of roughly 8 in Hurepoix death inventories from large farms 
in the years 1 550- 1 670. Because of the stiff soils, the Bernonville figure is a bit high, but not 
outrageously so. The farm had 1 4  cows per 1 00 hectares, versus 1 0  in the Beauce in 1 787, 1 2  on the 
plains north of Paris in the I 7 40s, 1 4  in the Brie in the 1 7  30s, and a range of 6 to 1 5  in the H urepoix
large farm inventories from period 1 550- 1 670. The number of sheep was equa11y close to the norm: 
235 per 100 hectares in Bernon ville, l 52 in the Beauce, 192 on the plains north of Paris, 2 1 8  in the 
74 Sources for the fo11owing discussion include Tessier, Encyclopedie methodigue: Agriculture, 
sv "Bail," and "Andonville"; forthcoming work by GiUes Postel-Vinay and J. M. Moriceau; Mireaux, 
La Brie, pp. 97- 164, 322- 4 1 ;  and Jacquart, Crise rurale, pp. 289-408; . 
75 Chevet, "Marquisat d'Ormesson," 493-508. 
76 The figures here are for farms with 2 or more plows only. 
77 One complication here is that the Bernonville accounts did not use the local area measure, the 
jalois, but rather an unspecified aroent, which was probably the aroent de Paris, equal to .34 hectares, 
rather than the aroent commun, equal to .42 hectares. Using the aroent commun would mean 1 plow 
for every 53 hectares, still within the range. For the local area measure on the Bernonville farm, see 
Annuaire statistique et administratif du ctepartement de l'Aisne pour l'annee 1 837 (Laon, 1 837), pp.
250-59. 
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Brie, and a median of 254 in the Hurepoix inventories.78 
Since the number of animals did not vary greatly from farm to farm or over time, it is also 
reasonable to assume that animal outputs (chiefly wool and mutton) did not vary much either. 
Breeding practices did not change drastically, despite much discussion in the late eighteenth century, 
and there was in any case little reason for farmers in the Paris Basin to shift drastically into stock 
raising. 79 The price of wool, mutton, and dairy products moved in parallel with that of wheat 
between 1 520 and 1 789, and transportation costs always favored grain production in the Paris Basin. 
In addition to the farm accounts and death inventories, one can find evidence in favor of the 
Bernon ville factor and product shares by examining sharecropping contracts. Sharecropping contracts 
were rare in the Paris Basin, but some did exist in parts of the Brie, where they involved a 
complicated division of outputs and inputs between tenant and landlord. Terms of the sharecropping 
contracts varied, but examples from the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries imply that the 
product and factor shares must have satisfied several restrictions. For example, in one type of 
contract the landlord furnished nothing beyond the land and received one third of the grain output 
and one third of the hay. The land share must therefore have been less than one third but greater 
than one third times the grain product share. For Bernonville, the land share (0.267) satisfied both 
inequalities: it was less than one third and greater than one third of the grain product share (0.224). 
Other contracts imply that the land share plus half the expenditure on seed, feed, and harvest labor 
should be approximately one half. For Bernon ville, the numbers add up to 0.53, very close to one half 
indeed.80 
One final piece of evidence in favor of our constant shares assumption comes from 
demographic records. If the land and labor factor shares are constant, then the ratio of rent to wages 
will be proportional to the ratio of labor to land, which we can reasonably approximate by the rural 
population, provided that the labor force participation rate and the amount of capital invested in land 
do not change drastically. We can therefore detect drastic shifts in the factor shares of labor and land 
(provided they do not both change in a way that keeps their ratio constant) by plotting the ratio of 
-------,"'e"'r"tt�to.,__,wages--alongside--!Jh ef rural ll��d and labor facct .. onr--.,Shttca'"r"e"'s----­
changed, the graph of the rent-to-wage ratio would presumably diverge from the population curve. 
We do not know the rural population precisely, but we might approximate it by rural baptisms, 
although this represents yet another questionable assumption. If we do so, we see that the curve of 
baptisms and the graph of the rent-wage ratio move together (Figure A-2). The baptisms here come 
from a region that is much larger than that of our farms, and the graph only covers the period 1671-
1 720.81 Still, despite all the approximations and assumptions, the agreement is impressive. And if 
we graph the rent-wage ratio over the period 1 450 to 1 789, it parallels what we know about the trend 
of the population, at least until the last decades of the eighteenth century. 
78 All of these calculations are based on an arpent of .34 hectares for the Bernonville farm. The 
evidence from the Hurepoix comes from Jacquart's death inventories for grandes exploitations in 
Crise rurale, pp. 355-56. 
79 On attempts to reform breeding and stock raising, see Bourde, Agronomie, 2:743-898. 
8° For the sharecropping contracts, see Mireaux, La Brie, pp. I 09- 1 1 ; none of the sharecropping
contracts here involved Notre Dame. The factor and product shares from the farm described by 
Moriceau and Postel-Vinay also satisfy the sharecropping inequalities. 
81 The baptism figures are derived from Jacques Dupaquier, La population rurale du Bassin 
Parisien a l'epogue de Louis XIV (Paris, 1979), p. 239. The baptisms come from an area that extends
over 300 kilometers from Paris--much further than any of our properties. Both the rent-wage ratio 
and the baptism series have been normalized to have mean 1 ,  and both series are averages over the
current year and the previous eight years. 
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In the text of the paper, we also calculated TFP using alternate shares from a farm north of 
Paris, whose accounts have been analyzed by Gilles Postel-Vinay and J. M. Moriceau in their 
forthcoming study of the Chartier family. The factor shares from the Postel-Vinay and Moriceau 
farm are as follows: labor, including compensation for the fermier, 0.476; rental cost of livestock, 
0 . 1 32; equipment rental, 0.022; land, 0.370. Their product shares are: wheat output, 0.473; oats and 
straw, 0.299; other crops, 0.02 1 ;  animal products, 0.206. Postel-Vinay and Moriceau's accounts give 
grain output net of seed, and hence I treated seed as an intermediate product, not as an input. I also 
refigured their cost of capital goods to reflect the rental cost, using interest and depreciation rates. 
The depreciation rates were the same as for Bernonville, except for equipment (0.244), which, as in 
the case of Bernonville, was derived from actual maintenance costs. 
Although these alternate shares may at first glance seem very different from the Bernonville 
figures, most of the difference results from aggregating inputs and outputs and from treating seed 
as an intermediate product. 82 Had we followed the same procedure with the Bernon ville accounts, 
the Bernonville shares would have been very close to the alternate shares from the Postel-Vinay and 
Moriceau farm. The Bernon ville labor factor share, for example, would become 0.452, and the animal 
product share would be 0.254, both close to the alternate shares. Apart from the aggregation and the 
treatment of seed, the differences between the two sets of shares is therefore small, and the 
aggregation and treatment of seed turn out to have very little effect on the calculation of TFP. 
Aggregation merely lumps together correlated prices in the indices C and P, and treating seed as an 
intermediate good merely divides both C and P by very nearly the same number. In both instances 
the ratio P/C, which is what we need to calculate TFP, remains nearly unchanged. 
As noted in the text, the effect of the alternate shares on the path TFP took was not large. 
The alternate shares had an even smaller effect on the growth rate of TFP (Figure A-3) and they left 
the regressions with TFP and with its growth rate largely unchanged (Tables A- I and A-2).
7. Wages in Paris and the Surrounding Countryside
The evidence for the mobility of labor near Paris covers the period from the fifteenth century 
through the eighteenth century, and in their forthcoming study of the Chartier family, Gilles Postel­
Vinay and J. M. Moriceau even suggest that farm labor in the Paris Basin was more mobile in the 
eighteenth century than in the nineteenth. Such high mobility supports the view that wages in Paris 
and in the surrounding countryside (at least for the circumscribed area of our sample) tended to be 
equal. It argues in favor of using the homogenous series of daily wages for unskilled laborers in Paris 
as the rural price of labor. 
Still, one might prefer direct evidence for wage equality. Micheline Baulant's work, which 
was cited in the text, supports wage equality for the sixteenth century, but there remains the 
seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries--particularly the latter.83 Data, unfortunately, is lacking 
for this period, even in the archives. One reason is that the typical sources for wage data in the Paris 
Basin--hospitals and ecclesiastical institutions--run dry after the sixteenth century. Detailed accounts 
disappear, perhaps because the hospitals and monasteries relied more heavily on agents such as 
82 Because of the aggregation of inputs and outputs, I relied on the following prices with the 
alternate shares: the rental price of horses for the price of livestock, the price of oats for oats and 
straw, the price of beans and peas for other crops, and the price of meat for animal products. 
83 Baulant, "Le salaire des ouvriers"; idem, "Prix et salaires," pp. 980-86. Baulant notes one major 
exception to the pattern of wage equaiity--vignerons--but she relates the peculiar behavior of their
wages to their situation and to the way in which they were paid. 
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Table A-1 - TFP REGRESSIONS WITH ALTERNATE PRICES AND SHARES 
Regression Number 
Dependent Variable 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Constant 
Dummy: Years 1775 
and After 
Dummy: War Years
1589-97 
Percent Meadow 
Percent Vineyard 
Dummy: Good Soil 
Ln (Distance to Paris 
in Kilometers) 
Dummy: Tenant Holdover 
from Previous Lease 
Time (Units of 
100 Years) 
Ln (Area in Hectares) 
0 bservations
R2 
Standard Error 
Mean of Dependent Variable 
(1)  (2) 
Ln (TFP) Alternate Shares Ln (TFP) Alternate Prices 
0.48 -0.79 
(1 .87) (-4.01) 
0.10 0.084 
(2.33) (1.54) 
-0.42 -0.24 
(-8.68) (-6.47) 
0.21 0.14 
(3.17) (2.69) 
0.012 -0.058 
(0.09) (-0.50) 
-0.0016 0.000057 
pr.ug -0.004 
-0.093 -0.078 
(-6.02) (-6.45) 
0.025 0.013 
( 1 .38) (0.91) 
0.064 0 . 11  
( 4.20) (9.36) 
-0.033 -0.019 
(-3.69) (-2.67) 
638 620 
0.30 0.34 
0.23 0.17 
1 . 1 1  0.67 
Note: In regression 1, TFP is calculated using alternate shares described in text. In regression
2, it is calculated using prices and wages for the expected term of the new lease (the year the 
lease was signed and the next eight years), and in-kind rent payments were evaluated using the 
same prices. See appendices 6 and 9 for details. In both regressions TFP has been adjusted for
taxes. T-statistics are in parentheses. 
Source: As in Table 2. 
Table A-2 - TFP GROWTH RATE REGRESSION FOR ALTERNATE PRICES AND SHARES 
Regression Number (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable Growth Rate T FP Growth Rate TFP 
Alternate Shares Alternate Prices 
(Percent per Year) (Percent per Year) 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Constant 0.72 0.12 
(1.53) (0.32) 
Growth Rate of Taxes -2.25 -9.49 
Relative to Rents (-0.82) (-4.38) 
Growth Rate Paris 0.32 0.21 
Population (6.25) (5.08) 
Dummy: Years 1775 1 .15 2.05 
and After (2.89) (3.95) 
Dummy: War Years -3.28 0.18 
1589-1597 (-5.90) (0.40) 
Dummy: Building -0.46 -0.38 
Repairs (-0.95) (-1.00) 
Dummy: Tenant Holdover -0.13 -0.20 
from Previous Lease (-0.71) (-1.41) 
Ln (Distance to Paris -0.13 -0.027 
in Kilometers (-0.93) (-0.24) 
Ln (Area -0.023 0.036 
in Hectares) (-0.32) (0.60) 
0 bservations 648 630 
R2 0.21 0.08 
Standard Error 2.24 1.76 
Mean Dependent Variable 0.19 0.13 
Note: Growth rates equal the rate of change of logarithms calculated from lease to lease, and 
as in Table 3, the TFP growth rates are not adjusted for taxes. TFP was calculated for 
alternate prices and shares as in Table A-1; see appendices 6 and 9 for details. T-statistics are 
in parentheses. 
Source: As in Table 2. 
fermiers and receveurs.84 When added to the difficulty of dealing with in-kind payments and the 
enormous variations due to differences in strength and skill, it becomes difficult to find useable 
sources for rural wages. 
Still, there is some evidence for the continuing equality of rural and urban wages. South of 
Paris, in Bretigny-sur-Orge, for example, a charretier earned 92 livres in 1 6 1 4 ,  plus in-kind 
compensation, which we might reasonably suppose was the equivalent of 3 Paris setiers of wheat. If 
we average the price of wheat over the period 16 10- 18 ,  his total compensation amounted to 123 livres. 
In the same year, an unskilled Parisian day laborer, if he worked 200 days (the typical number of days 
of work in a year for a day laborer), would earn 1 20 livres, nearly exactly the same amount. In 1622 
in the same village, another charretier and his wife earned 72 livres and 9 Paris setiers of grain 
working for the seigneur, which works out to 1 86 livres at Paris prices. If the charretier had worked 
200 days in Paris and his wife had done the same for half the male wage (a typical figure for female 
labor), they would have earned nearly the same amount-- 195 livres. 
In 1 7 1 4 - 1 5  unskilled building workers earned 1 5  to 25 sous a day in Bretigny; at the time, the 
modal wage for the unskilled in Paris was 20 sous a day. And in the last years of the Old Regime in 
Bretigny, the unskilled earned between 1 2  to 20 sous a day in winter and between 25 to 30 sous a day 
in summer. In Paris in the 1 770s and 1 780s, the mode of February wages ranged between 1 8  and 24 
sous in February and between 22 and 28 sous in July. The winter wage in Bretigny was lower and 
the summer wage higher, but the annual earnings were about the same. 85 
One can certainly find examples of wage gaps between city and countryside, but the gap is 
usually much smaller than the enormous disparity of wages within the city itself or within any village. 
In I 754-55, for example, the average Paris wage (actually the average of monthly modal wages) was
2 1  sous per day for an unskilled day laborer. Out in the countryside, the Abbey of Maubuisson in 
Saint-Ouen, near Pontoise, was hiring workers to fish and to clean the fish pond for an average of 
22 sous per day. The gap between the two is small and dwarfed by the range of wages in Paris, where 
monthly modal wages in 1 754-55 varied between 1 8  and 24 sous a day. Some evidence exists that 
-------"'llcgeS-were-scm:iewhat--lower-in__tbe_co11n tr¥Shle,_butnone__af_jtJs__cnnclullie_fo_r__thJl_illd�R�e,,,g"'i m�ec,. 8_6 ____ _ 
84 Gaubert, Beauvais, 1 :55 1 ;  Baulant, "Prix et salaires," p.954-55, 977-979. Cf. Ernest Labrousse, 
Esquisse du mouvement des prix et des revenus en France au XVI!Ie siecle, 2 vols. (Paris, 1934; 
reprint, 1984), 2:470-74. In the Paris Basin we also lack wage data from the sort of detailed 
communal archives that exist in market towns and even villages in Provence. 
85 Bertrandy-Lacabane, Bretigny-sur-Orge, p. 340-43; Baulant, "Le salaire des ouvriers," pp. 463-
83; idem, "Le prix des grains"; Yves Durand, "Recherches sur les salaires des mai;ons a Paris au XVIIIe
siecle," Revue d'histoire economigue et sociale 44(1966):468-80. For the number of work days in the 
year, see Labrousse, Esquisse, 2:50 I -03;
86 AD Val d'Oise, 72H 30, 32, 33; Durand, "Recherches sur !es salaires." Wages for the workers 
who fished and cleaned the fish pond varied considerably in Saint-Ouen as well: between 1 4  and 35 
sous in 1 759. The high figure of 35 sous suggests that there was probably considerable skill or 
difficulty involved, which further complicates the comparison. 
As for evidence that rural wages were lower, consider the Abbey of Maubuisson's payments 
for work on its colombjer. In I 739, the abbey paid day laborers an average of 1 3.4 sous a day for 
work on the colombier, considerably lower than the Paris mean wage for unskilled workers of 1 9  sous. 
In 1 740, it paid an average of 1 7  .7 �. while the Paris mean was 20. Unfortunately, we do not know 
if the abbey fed its workers (it may well have done so in 1 739), and the comparison is further clouded 
by the seasonality of wages. Work on the colombier might have been done off season, and in that case 
the difference between the Paris wage and what the abbey paid would be much smaller indeed and 
hardly conclusive. 
The accounts.of the Abbey of Maubuisson in AD Val d'Oise 72 H 22-33 cited here seemed 
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Nor can one demonstrate conclusively that rural wages were rising or falling relative to wages in 
Paris.87 Given the overwhelming evidence for labor mobility in the vicinity of Paris, it seems 
reasonable to assume that wages in the city and in its hinterland moved together. 
8. Grain Prices and In-Kind Payments
Much grain seems to have escaped the market, reaching consumers in the form of payments 
in kind or self production. One might therefore assume that the price of grain on the farm would 
bear no relationship to the market prices that enter into the agricultural price index P. For the Paris 
Basin, though, such a view seems untenable: near Paris it is simply absurd to maintain that the 
payments of grain in kind amounted to a second market, in which the price of grain bore no relation 
to that in the open market. The canons of the Paris cathedral of Notre Dame, for example, received 
numerous payments in kind, but they evaluated the grain at the price current in the relevant market-­
in Paris if the grain was delivered there, in a local market if they took possession in the countryside. 
And when it came time to sell grain from their stores, the canons watched the market to see what 
their grain would fetch.88 The payments in kind, therefore, do not seem to have constituted a 
separate and unrelated market, all the more so since rights to the grain due in kind (tithe payments, 
for example) were often purchased for cash. The same logic casts doubt on the assumption that the 
price of grain on the farm was unrelated to the market price. Most peasants had to buy grain to meet 
their needs, and among the tenants who ran the farms in our sample there were many large scale 
farmers who frequently sold on the market. 
9. Setting the Rent, Prices in the Indexes P and C, and Alternate Price Averages
When renting out its properties, the Cathedral of Notre Dame did not simply follow local 
surveyor's indications about what land was worth; rather, it sought to make a profit. It wanted to 
-------ll€e"1a�SeB-llp>Fr&opeaerr1t01eies-''u1Hlu-the-lle&t-µGS&�(=*CUO-whauheJocal market would bear) and 
it made decisions about property management on the basis of profits. A decision to enlarge a barn 
a promising source for rural wages in the Paris Basin, and I examined them for the late seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. Unfortunately, most of the records were silent on essential details, such as 
in-kind payments to workers or the precise types of workers employed, and worst of all, the useable 
information was simply too fragmentary to permit the construction of a homogenous rural wage series. 
87 The forthcoming work by Postel-Vinay and Moriceau contains a table of cash payments to 
male domestics on a single farm during the years 1 73 1 - 1 75 1 .  If we assume that their in-kind wages 
amounted to 3 setiers of wheat a year and if we restrict ourselves to years when figures for both Paris 
wages and the domestics' wages are available, then we find that the domestics' compensation increased 
1 2.5  percent between 1 73 1 -37 and 1 738-51 ,  while Paris wages grew only 7 . 1  percent. The in-kind 
wages here have been evaluated using local prices from Soissons. The difference would suggest that 
rural wages were rising more rapidly than urban wages, but if we look at evidence from the Abbey 
of Maubuisson, the reverse seems to have been the case. There, if we make the same assumptions 
concerning in-kind compensation, we find that the earnings of the same sort of domestic decreased 
3.5 percent between 1 727-4 1 and 1 755-64, whereas Paris wages grew 9.9 percent. Given the disparate 
results and the uncertainties surrounding the in-kind compensation, none of the evidence seems 
conclusive. 
88 AN S320, 27 November 1 486; S324A, 25 June 1 78 1 ;  S 359, 22 November 1 496; S380B; Dupre 
de Saint Maur, Essai sur !es monnoies ou reflexions sur le raoport entre !'argent et Jes denrees (Paris, 
1 746), p. 1 27 ( 1 644). The aigument that farm gate prices bear no relationship to market prices rests 
upon a radical misinterpretation of Meuvret, Subsistences, vol. 3 .  
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in 1 757 on the cathedral's property in Viersy, for example, hinged on whether the increased rent 
would yield an investment return greater than that available from rentes. The cathedral did fear that 
charging exorbitant rents might bankrupt tenants, but such fears were hardly inconsistent with profit 
maximization. After all, a bankrupt tenant would sap profits in the long run.89 
When deciding if the rent on a farm should be increased, Notre Dame estimated the tenant's 
revenues and costs. If the revenues exceeded the costs, the cathedral raised the rent, taking care again 
that the tenant not be pressed into bankruptcy. During the whole process, the point of reference was 
the previous lease. Whether Notre Dame was implicitly using current prices or prices averaged over 
the recent past to calculate profits is not clear, but the calculations never involved guesses about 
future prices.90 
Other landlords seemed to do the same. When the knowledgeable agronomist abbe Tessier 
wrote on leases in the Encyclopedie methodique, his concerns were nearly identical to those of Notre 
Dame. He aimed to increase profits, although his own practical experience as a property manager 
made him realize, as did Notre Dame, that pressing a tenant too hard would backfire in the long run. 
When it came to estimating the rent that a property would yield, Tessier urged his readers to 
follow the analysis of a memoire published in 1 789 by Varenne de Fenille, a correspondent of the 
Societe d' Agriculture de Paris. "I have never found anything that shed more light on evaluating the 
rent that agricultural land could yield," said Tessier, and he quoted the memoir in its entirety.91 
Varenne de Fenille shared Tessier's concerns about tenant bankruptcy, but what was most 
noticeable about Varenne de Fenille's memoire was the grain prices that he used in analyzing rental 
value. He performed his calculations using two different grain prices. One was a low price, a price 
apparently below the prevailing market price. He used this low price out of a concern that undue 
pressure not be placed on the tenant farmer; it was in no sense a forecast of the price in the future. 
The other price he used was a high price equal to the average price over the previous ten years. This 
ten-year average, he believed, would better reflect the true price that grain would actually fetch, and 
we can surmise that it would presumably yield a rent figure closer to what a profit-maximizing 
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Prices averaged over the recent past, and it would seem reasonable that our indexes P and C do the 
same.92 
Following Varenne de Fenille and in the spirit of Notre Dame's own practices, I therefore 
averaged all prices in the indexes P and C over the current year and the previous eight years--in other 
words, over the outgoing lease.93 To check how sensitive my results were to this choice of prices, 
I also computed TFP with prices averaged over the new lease (in other words, over the current year 
89 See, for example, AN LL329-30 (La-Grande-Paroisse, 1 6 1 8  and 1 689); LL 332 (Larchand,
1 762); LL 350-5 1 (Viry, 1 7 57); S 267, S 457 (Ferrieres, 1 7 75); S 247 (Epiais, 1 693). On some 
occasions Notre Dame posted a price for the rental on affiches that were put up locally; if there were 
no takers, they would lower the rent and put up new affiches. 
90 AN S 242 (Dampmart, 1 744-62); S 282 (La-Grande-Paroisse, 1 746). 
91 Tessier, Agriculture, sv. "Bail."
92 Ibid, especially pp. 24-26. 
93 For beans and peas, flax, livestock, and animal products, there was too much missing data to 
construct annual price series. For these items I first took 25-year averages, which I assumed to be 
the price at the mid-point of each 25-year period. I then constructed annual series by interpolating 
between the mid-points; the interpolation was linear in the logarithm of the prices. Since averaging 
an interpolated price over the life of the previous lease would involve averaging 'vhat \.vas already an 
average, I simply used the price at the midpoint of the previous lease. 
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and the next eight years), but as noted in the text, the effect on the TFP trend was small. Using 
prices over the new lease also led to roughly similar patterns for the growth rate of TFP (Figure A-3) 
and very similar regression coefficients (Tables A-1  and A-2). Other price averages (such as a 3-year 
moving average centered on the current year) had an equally small effect on our results. 
10 . Entrepreneurial Profits
While there were certainly farms where the tenants made fortunes, entrepreneurial profits-­
defined here to be what the tenants earned over what he would have made on the labor market--were 
probably low on average. In 1 784, for example, Boullanger, an ingenieur des ponts et chaussees, 
provided a detailed analysis of the profits from Paris Basin farming for an article on taxes in the 
Encyclopedie methodique.94 The analysis rested on calculations he had made while levying taxes 
in order to pay for road building in the Champagne and the Soissonais in the 1750s. It derived from 
the costs and profits of local farms and was done with extraordinary care. After carefully deriving 
the profits from a farm of a fixed area, Boullanger compared them with rent and taxes. Before rent 
and taxes were paid, the profits amounted to 6986 livres; the rent and taxes to be paid out of these 
profits came to 6232 livres. The remainder, 753 livres or 1 2 . l  percent of the rent plus taxes, was the 
tenant's profit net of rent and taxes. According to Boullanger, such a figure was typical, for in 
general the tenant's profits were about 1 /8 of sum spent on rent plus taxes.95 
If we take 1/8 of rent plus taxes as the average for the tenant's entrepreneurial profits, and 
if we assume that rent and taxes paid for land, then with the Bernon ville land share (0.267), the factor 
share for the tenant's entrepreneurial input would be only 0.267 /8, or 0.033 of total cost. This is 
small, but other contemporary authorities would put it even lower: Lavoisier even claimed that 
entrepreneurial profits were zero on average.96 
With a share of only 0.033 of total cost, entrepreneurial profits would have very little effect 
on our calculation of TFP. Moreover, they would only disturb our calculations if they diverged 
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entrepreneur (i.e, the tenant farmer) as part of the labor input; in other words, we assumed that the 
tenant would earn no more than he would in the labor market. Even if his earnings did exceed his 
income as a laborer, our calculation of TFP would involve no error, provided that the trend of 
entrepreneurial earnings paralleled the trend of wages (i.e., provided that their ratio remained 
constant). As long as the two moved together, we could simply view his higher wage as compensation 
for his skill, with a fixed conversion factor between his skilled wage and that of an unskilled laborer. 
His compensation could then simply be aggregated together with that of the rest of labor in 
calculating TFP. In mathematical terms, if w2 is the cost of the tenant's entrepreneurial input, w3 is wage of unskilled labor, and k > 1 is a constant such that w2 = kw3, then 
TFP = (19) 
and aggregating the entrepreneurial input with the rest of labor only multiplies the TFP index by a 
94 Rousselot de Surgy, Enclopedie methodigue ou par ordre de matieres. Finances, 3 vols. (Paris, 
1 784), sv. "Charges publiques" by M Boullanger, ingenieur des ponts et chaussees. 
95 Ibid, especially p. 288. 
96 A. L. Lavoisier, Oeuvres de Lavoisier, 6 vols (Paris, 1 864-93), 6:4 5 1 .  The assertion is made 
in a carefui atten:1pt to calculate French income, in which Lavoisier allows for the alternative 
possibility of small entrepreneurial profits from raising livestock. 
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constant. 
There were of course times when wages and entrepreneurial earnings undoubtedly diverged. 
After many tenants went bankrupt in the late seventeenth century and the first decades of the 
eighteenth century, those who survived may have earned high returns relative to unskilled wages. But 
by 1 750, Notre Dame had discovered the higher profits and raised the rent, and entrepreneurial 
earnings by tenants probably returned to a level in harmony with wages.97 In any event, the effect 
on our TFP index probably small. Suppose, for example, that the ratio of the tenant's skilled 
entrepreneurial wages (w2 in equation 1 9) to unskilled wages (w3) varied (in suitable units) from 1 .67to 2.5. This was the maximum range of the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages in the Paris building 
trades over three centuries; normally the ratio was close to 2.98 Our TFP index would then err by 
at most 0.7 percent, very little indeed and not enough to change our story. 
If we are still worried about entrepreneurial profits, we can also take comfort from our TFP 
regressions. Presumably, the farmers who made large profits would be those who repeated as tenants. 
Their large profits would keep them on the same farm, depress the rent figures and produce lower 
measurements of TFP and less measured TFP growth. But if we examine the coefficients of the 
variables for tenant holdovers in Tables 2 and 3, we see that nothing of the sort occurred. If 
anything, repeat tenants increased the level of TFP and depressed TFP growth by only a minimal 
amount. 
1 1 . A Comparison of Our Productivity Index and the Tornqvist-Translog Index 
Appendix 6 described the factor and product shares from a farm whose accounts were 
analyzed by Postel-Vinay and Moriceau. The factor and product shares come from the farm's 
accounts for the 1 740s, but accounts for the farm also exist for the I 780s.99 Taken together, the two
sets of accounts let us calculate how TFP on the farm changed between the 1 740s and 1 780s, and since 
the information in the accounts allows us to calculate TFP with considerable precision, we can use 
the results to chec!Cthe accuracy of the IFP mdex used throughout the text of the paper.
The way to measure TFP precisely is to use the modern theory of index numbers, which 
permits calculating TFP without estimating production, cost, or profit functions. Let us suppose that 
we want to compare the productivity of two farms, both of which produce multiple outputs. The two 
farms can exist at different times, and we can even compare the same farm at different moments. 
Because of productivity differences, the two farms will have different production functions, but we 
assume that the two distinct production functions at least share a common functional form, in a sense 
to be made precise below. 
In this situation, if the two farms exhibit constant returns to scale, if all product and factor 
markets are competitive, and if the two farmers optimize (in the sense that they minimize costs 
97 AN S 242 (Dampmart, 1 744-62); S 282 (La-Grande-Paroisse, 1 746). The forthcoming book 
by Postel-Vinay and Moriceau provides another example of high entrepreneurial profits by a tenant 
farmer, and it also suggests why entrepreneurial profits may have come back down relative to wages 
in the late eighteenth century. As more tenant farmers sent their children to colleges in the eighteenth 
century, it is possible that more of the children learned arithmetic and simple accounting. In the end, 
competition among the children when they became tenants brought entrepreneurial profits down. 
Unfortunately, we cannot tell if tenants had such a secondary-school education. It involved much 
more than simple literacy, which had long been common among local tenants, and it left no traces in 
Notre Dame's archives. 
98 Baulant, "Les salaires du batiment," pp. 480-8 1 .  
ss The farm had changed somewhat between the 1 740s and the 1 780s, but the kernel of the 
operation remained the same and the same family operated it. 
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conditional on output levels and maximize revenues conditional on input levels), then we can compare 
the productivity of the two farms by using an appropriate index of inputs, outputs, and prices. The 
choice of a particular index amounts to a choice of the functional form common to the two production 
function; the ideal index would correspond to a functional form such as the translog that can provide 
a second order approximation to an arbitrary production function. Such an index is called superlative.1°0 
In particular, suppose that we are comparing the productivity of the Postel-Vinay and 
Moriceau farm in the 1 780s with its productivity in the 1 740s. Let the production functions for our 
farms (or strictly speaking, the transformation function, since the farms produce multiple outputs) 
have the translog form with identical second order coefficients for both farms. The first order 
coefficients may be completely different. Under these assumptions, the so called Tornqvist index 
provides a measure of the TFP of our farms, and the ratio of TFP on the farm in the 1 780s to TFP 
in the 1 740s is 
(20) 
Here y,. . .  . ,y4 are the four farm outputs (wheat, oats and straw, other crops, and animal products) inthe 1 740s; the ui, the corresponding output shares; the xi, the four inputs (labor and the tenant's 
entrepreneurial input, livestock rental, equipment rental, and land) in the 1 740s; the vi, the 
corresponding factor shares; and the variables with primes are the same quantities in the 1 7 80s. 
We can calculate (20) using the evidence from the farm accounts. The accounts give the 
revenue produced by each output and the cost of each input in the 1 740s and 1 780s; I divided the 
revenues and the costs by the appropriate prices to get the quantities. 101 The prices I used included 
the local price of wheat (rather than the Pans pnce) for wheat output; the Ponto1se pnce of oats for 
oats and straw; the interpolated Paris price of beans for other crops; the interpolated price of meat 
for animal products; the local wage (rather than the Paris wage) for labor; the rental price of horses 
for livestock; and the rental price of equipment. All rental prices equalled the sales price multiplied 
by interest plus depreciation, with the depreciation rates given in appendix 6. For land, instead of 
10° For this and the following paragraph, see Robert C. Allen, "Recent Developments in 
Production, Cost and Index Number Theory, with an Application to International Differences in the 
Cost and Efficiency of Steelmaking in 1907 /09," in Rainer Fremdling and Patrick O'Brien, eds., 
Productivity in the Economies of Europe (Stuttgart, 1983), pp, 90-99; idem and W E. Diewert, "Direct 
versus Superlative Index Number Formulae," Review of Economics and Statistics 53( 198 1 ):430-35; 
Douglas W. Caves et al, "Multilateral Comparisons of Output, Input and Productivity using Superlative 
Index Numbers," The Economic Journal 92(1982):73-86; idem, "The Economic Theory of Index 
Numbers and the Measurement of Input, Output, and Productivity," Econometrica 50( 1 982):1 393-
1 4 1 4; W. E. Diewiert, "Exact and Superlative Index Numbers," Journal of Econometrics 4( 1976): 1 1 5-
45; and Chambers, Applied Production Analysis, pp. 239-49. 
101 Some of the inputs and outputs are aggregates and so we have to rely on prices to get the 
composite commodities; in other cases, the farm records mentioned only revenues and costs, not 
quantities. 
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dividing costs by a price, I used the ratio of the actual physical quantities of land employed.102 
If we perform the calculation, we find that TFP increased 9.79 percent on the farm between 
the 1 740s and the 1 7 80s. The 9.79 percent figure is very close to the 9.03 percent that our own TFP 
index yields when applied to the Postel-Vinay and Moriceau property, even though our index employs 
Paris prices and factor and product shares from the very different property in Bernonville. The 
accuracy here is obviously a strong vote of confidence for our method. 
It should also be noted that little of the small gap between the two figures derives from our 
assumption of constant shares. Most of it stems from differences between Bernon ville and the Postel­
Vinay and Moriceau farms and from the fact that the our method relies on Paris prices rn3 With 
constant shares mattering little, at least in this instance, the sort of sophisticated flexible functional 
forms discussed at the end of appendix 5 would seem to have very little to offer us. 
1 2. Averaging TFP 
Suppose that we want to average ln(TFP) for each 25-year period in order to chart 
productivity trends. From equation ( I  0) we know that
ln(TFP) = s ln(r + t) - ln( p)c 
(10)  
One obvious way to  proceed would be  to  average the expression on the right hand side of  ( IO)  lease
by lease for all leases in a given 25-year period. Alternatively, we could average sln(r + t) over all 
leases in the period and then subtract ln(P/C) averaged over each of the years in the same 
period.104 The two procedures will not necessarily give the same answer, for in the one case we 
are averaging ln(P/C) over all the leases drawn up in the period, weighting each lease equally, and 
in the other case we are averaging it over all the years in the period, weighting each year evenly. If 
1 he leases were clustered toward one end of the period, for example, the procedures might yield 
very different values of TFP. 
In practice however, the two procedures yield results that are practically indistinguishable 
(Figure A-4). The same is true if we average ln(TFP) by decade. Since there is practically no 
difference between the two methods, we will compute our average of ln(TFP) lease by lease. Working 
lease-by-lease fits our regressions, and it has the indisputable advantage of allowing direct 
comparison with the TFP growth rate figures, which must be calculated lease-by-lease and which are 
the only device we have to estimate the effect of taxes. 
In Figure A-4, I adjusted the rent for variations in land quality, but I did not correct either 
average for the omission of taxes. In other words, both curves assume taxes are zero and simply 
average sln(r) - ln(P/C) for each 25-year period. Since the tax correction merely involves adding the 
same term to both averages, it would have an identical effect on each of them and would do nothing 
to drive them apart. 
102 For equipment, the sales price was taken to be proportional to wages, as elsewhere in this 
paper. All prices were averages over the 1 740s and the 1 780s. 
103 If we were to assume constant shares yet use local prices and factor and product shares from
the Postel-Vinay and Moriceau farm itself, we could calculate a TFP increase of either 9.72 or 1 0.09 
percent, depending on whether we chose the shares from the 1 740s or the 1 780s. The minuscule gap 
between these two figures and the 9.79 figure is what is properly due to the constant shares 
assumption. 
104 We could also calculate the average value of P/C for the 25-year period and take its logarithm,
but the result turns out to differ little from averaging ln(P/C) over the same period. 
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1 3. Treatment of Taxes 
Unfortunately, we do not know precisely what the taxes on an individual farm were, and as 
a result we first calculate TFP and its growth rate with rent r alone, ignoring taxes t in formulas such 
as ( 10). In other words, we begin by using T = r'C/P as a substitute for TFP = (r+t)'C/P. We then 
add an adjustment for the omission of taxes. To derive the adjustment, let 
r 
- = g
r + t 
(21)  
where g is the fraction of gross rent w1 that goes to the landlord rather than to the fisc. Note that thetax rate as a percent of gross rent is simply I - g. Since r + t = r/g, we have that ln(TFP) is simply 
p r P 
s ln(r + t) - In(-) = s in (-) - In(-) = ln(1) - sln(g)c g c 
Similarly, the rate of growth of TFP is 
t - sg
(22) 
(23) 
All we need to know is g or its rate of growth and we can easily correct for the error involved in 
using T as a substitute for TFP. 
We do not know g precisely, and it probably varied from property to property. But one 
reasonable assumption is that for the i-th property, 
ta ln(g) = b in(-) + c, 
ra
(24) 
where b is a negative constant that is the same for all properties, t0 is the average per-capita tax 
assessment, ra is the average per-hectare rent 1n the region, and ci ts a constant that varies from 
property to property. All equation (24) says is that taxes were apportioned with an eye toward 
average rent and average population levels and that while tax rates varied from property to property 
they also rose and fell with average tax assessments and average rent levels. 
Note that 
g = b�ln(
1a)dt 
ra 
(25) 
Suppose we have a linear relationship involving the growth rate of TFP and various explanatory 
variables z1, . . .  ,zk: 
d dt ln(TFP) = d1z1 + ... +d,;.1 
Then by (23) and (25), we have that 
· d ta T = sb-ln(-) + d1z1 + ... +d,.z; dt 
ra 
(26) 
(27) 
According to equation (27), all we need do is regress the growth rate of T, which we can observe since 
T is simply r'C/P, on the variables zi, and on
�Jn( ta) 
dt ra
(28) 
which we can also measure. \Ve will then recover the coefficients in the true relationship bet\veen 
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the growth rate of TFP and the variables zj, and the coefficient of (28) will be sb, which we can use
to correct the growth rate of T for the om1ssion of taxes via 
d ' . · d ta 
-ln(TFP) = T - sg = T - sb-ln(-) dl dl '· ( 29)  
In the regressions in Tables 3 and A-2,  the rate of growth of taxes relative to rents is  (28), 
calculated from a national average per-capita tax rate by decade and average decennial nominal rents. 
The coefficient of (28) then allows us to correct the observed growth rate of TFP for the omission of 
taxes via equation (29). The correction turned out to be minimal: taxes certainly rose, but not by 
enough relative to nominal rents (Figure A-3). 105 The growth rate of TFP is thus almost exactly 
the growth rate of T. Note too that using the growth rate of T in place of the growth rate of TFP in 
Tables 3 and A-2 will not change the resulting regression coefficients. Again, the inclusion of the 
growth rate of taxes relative to rents among the explanatory variables will make the other coefficients 
precisely what they would be if the dependent variable were the true growth rate of TFP. 
Multicollinearity rules out adding the analogous term to the regression in Tables 2 and A-1  
in  order to correct the levels of  TFP for the omission of  taxes. We can, however, derive a correction 
for ln(TFP) from the growth rates. From (22) and (24), 
ta ln(1FP) = ln(I) - sln(g) = ln(I) - shin(-) - sc,ra 
(30) 
We know T, t., and r., and the regressions with the growth rate of T yields sb. The only other terms 
are the sci, which varies from property to property but not over time. Since they are constants, they 
do not affect the trend of TFP. If, for instance, we average ln(TFP) by 25-year periods, the sci terms 
merely add the same constant to the average for each period, and we can ignore them as far as the 
trend is concerned.106 In other words, we need only subtract sbln(t./r.) from ln(T) to adjust the 
level of ln(I FP) for the om1ss10n of taxes. !'hat IS what has been done rn F1gure 3 and throughout
the paper when we calculated relative levels of TFP. 
It is still true that the sci terms could affect our regression coefficients in the ln(TFP) 
regressions of Tables 2 and A - 1 .  If the true relationship between ln(TFP) and the explanatory 
variables z1, .. .,zk is
(31)  
then for the i-th property 
ta ln(I) - shin(-) = sc1 + e1z1 + ... + e..zt
'· 
(32) 
We could determine the sci by adding a dummy variable for each property to the regressions 
of ln(T) - sbln(t./r.) on the zj, but with 39 properties, multicollinearity rules out such a course of
action. Unfortunately, ignoring the sci amounts to omitting variables in the regression, which might 
well bias our coefficients ej. On the other hand, it seems reasonable to assume that the sci areuncorrelated with the other explanatory variables zj. After all, the sci reflect idiosyncracies of the
105 In Figure A-3, the adjustment for taxes is applied using the Bernonville shares and prices 
averaged over the outgoing lease. The growth rate curves plotted for alternate shares and alternate 
prices have not been corrected for taxes. 
106 If properties jump in and out of the sample, the effect of the sci terms may vary from period 
to period, depending on what properties remain in the sampie. The effect shouid be reiativeiy minor, 
though. 
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tax system peculiar to each property.107 If so, then the regression of ln(T) - sbln(t./r.) on the z .  
will produce the true regression coefficients ej , and we can correct ln(TFP) for taxes in the regression� merely by subtracting sbln(t.fr.). That is what I have done in Tables 2 and A- 1 .  
It is worth noting one other implication of (22) and (24). If we look at the change in ln(TFP) 
between two fixed periods for several properties, as we did for Figure 4, then for any property it will 
equal the change in ln(T) minus the change in sln(g), which from (24) will be the same for all the 
properties since the sci terms will drop out. The tax correction will merely add the same constant to 
the TFP growth figure for each property, and as long as we are only interested in the relative 
productivity growth of the properties, we can simply ignore the tax correction. Figure 4 therefore 
involves no adjustment for taxes. 
1 4 .  Sources 
The prices and wages that enter into the indexes P and C were taken from printed sources. 
Published price series for the Paris region are excellent for most commodities. They betray a care and 
a concern for detail that are all too often lacking in collections of rental figures, where details 
surrounding in-kind payments, variations in land quality, and other complexities are often passed 
over in silence. The published series merit our confidence, and as for the commodities that are 
exceptions to this rule--chiefly meat and livestock--they are ones for which further research will 
likely be of little avail. To be sure, a high quality series of wages from the Paris countryside would 
certainly be desirable. But as explained in appendix 7, suitable collections of rural wages are hard 
to find for the region, even in the archives. 108 
The grain prices in the index P were prices in Paris on the feast of Saint-Martin (November 
l l ) .  As I explained in appendix l ,  I selected the Saint-Martin prices because grain payments were 
due then. Choosing the feast of Saint-Martin also provided a way of dealing with seasonality. The 
Saint-Martin prices were taken from Baulant and Meuvret, Prix des cereales, 2: 1 42-5 1 .  For wheat 
and rye I used mm1mum prices on the�tuf Saint Mai tin, as was the case-wlth-tlv·�e�in-n�-"k"'innnct----­
payments; for barley and oats only maximum prices were available. 
Since the Saint-Martin prices ceased being available after 1698, I resorted to proxies. For 
wheat I relied upon the proxy that I used for in-kind payments. As described in appendix 1 ,  it was 
constructed by first regressing the Saint Martin wheat price on the annual Paris price without an 
intercept term. After 1698, when the annual Paris price existed but the Saint Martin did not, I 
multiplied the annual price by the regression coefficient to get the proxy. The annual Paris price 
came from Baulant, "Le prix des grains." 
For rye, barley, and oats, I constructed similar proxies for the years after 1 698 by regressing 
the Paris Saint-Martin price on the Pontoise Saint-Martin price without an intercept. The regressions 
were limited to the years 1 66 1 -98 because the size of the Pontoise setier was in doubt before 1 66 1 .  
The Pontoise prices came from Dupaquier, Mercuriales du pays de France.109 In constructing the 
107 An alternative is to look at changes in ln(TFP) relative to the same base period for each 
property, a standard technique with panel data. It leads to similar results. 
108 My own search for wage series in a suitable archival collection (in the accounts of the Abbey 
of Maubuisson in the AD Val d'Oise) led nowhere, for the documents needed to construct a 
homogenous series were lacking. 
109 The rye, barley, and oats proxies in the index P differed slightly from the prices I used for 
the in-kind payments. For in-kind payments of rye made in Paris, I used a proxy constructed by 
regressing the Saint Martin Paris price of rye on the annual Paris price of wheat. I did so because to 
convert in-kind payments to cash in leases before 1 520 I needed rye prices before 1 520, when the 
Pontoise prices were hOt available. For in-kind payments of barley and oats made in Paris, I used the 
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Paris grain price series, I corrected the published Paris price for two typographical errors, and I also 
adjusted the price of all grains for an 8 percent increase in the size of the Paris setier between 1 573 
and 1 586.1 1° 
Since the evidence was fragmentary, the prices of beef, mutton, and pork in the index P were 
interpolated from 25-year averages. 111  The averages were spliced together from prices in Georges 
d' Avenel, Histoire economigue de la propriete. des salaires. des denrees. et de to us Jes prix en general 
depuis l'an 1200 jusqu'en l'an 1 800, 7 vols. (Paris, 1 894- 1926; reprint, New York, 1969), 4: 1 32- 1 79, 
586; Labrousse, Esquisse, 1:30 1 -303 (his raw prices rather than his index); Mohamed El Kordi, 
Bayeux aux XV!Ie et XVII!e siecles (Paris, 1 970), pp. 303-05; and Jean-Claude Perrot, Genese d'une 
ville moderne: Caen au XVI!Ie siecle, 2 vols. (Paris, 1975), 2: 1 032- 1 034. Admittedly, the old 
collection by d'Avenel is far from perfect and the other sources are not necessarily Parisian. Yet the 
criticisms of d'Avenel are often exaggerated, and most of the non-Parisian prices were taken from 
nearby provinces such as Normandy, where long-distance trade in livestock would have brought local 
prices in line with those prevailing in Paris.112 
For the remaining outputs (beans and peas, flax, dairy products, wool, eggs, and horses), I also 
interpolated from 25-year averages. The sources for beans and peas included Mantellier, Memoire 
sur la valeur, pp. 89-98, 3 8 1 ;  Baulant, "Prix et salaires"; and Hauser, Recherches et documents, pp. 
1 27-29. For flax, I relied upon prices of fil de Jin in Mantellier, Memoire sur la valeur, pp. 276-77; 
Saint Martin prices; when they were unavailable--before 1 520 and after 1 698--I relied on 25-year 
averages. The 25-year averages were calculated using the Pontoise prices and Paris prices in Henri 
Hauser, Recherches et documents sur l'histoire des prix en France de 1 500 a 1 800 (Paris, 1936), pp.
1 14 - 1 7 ,  1 24-25. Before 1 500 I constructed the 25-year average price of oats by multiply the 25-year 
average annual price of Paris wheat by the ratio of oat prices to wheat prices in the years 1 500-24. 
I did the same for barley before 1 525. The difference between the in-kind conversion price and the 
price in the index P is slight and it cannot affect the results appreciably, for most m-kmd payments 
involved not rye, barley, or oats, but wheat. As for in-kind payments of grain made outside Paris 
and for miscellaneous in-kind payments, I evaluated them as outlined in appendix I ;  my sources
included Hauser, Recherches et documents; Dupre de Saint Maur, Essai sur !es monnoies; Dupaquier, 
Mercuriales du pays de France; the Paris wage series to be described below; and, for wine prices, 
Bertrandy-Lacabane, Bretigny-sur-Orge, p. 329; Baulant, "Prix et salaires"; and P. Mantellier, 
Memoire sur la valeur des principales denrees et marchandises qui se vendaient ou se consommaient 
en la ville d'Orleans (Orleans, 1 86 1 ), pp. 1 79- 1 86.  
110 In Baulant, "Le prix des grains," the year 1 708 is repeated twice, but the second price is clearly
that in 1 709. In 1 734, the price should be 1 2 . 1 3  livres rather than 1 7 . 1 3; I thank David Weir for 
providing me this information. Baulant and Meuvret, Le prix des certiales, 1 :  1 8-22, give Saint-Martin 
prices for a setier of constant volume (2.73 hectoliters for oats, 1 .56 hectoliters for other grains). 
They adjust their prices for changes in the size of the oats setier, but they do not correct grain prices 
for what they admit was probably an 8-percent increase in the size of both setiers between 1 573 and 
1 586, an increase that seems to have been caused by wear of the physical measure. To ensure that the 
prices in the index P would represent a constant volume, I assumed that the 8 percent increase was 
spread out evenly over the period 1 573-86. It  is worth pointing out that the prices used to convert 
the in-kind payments made in Paris were not adjusted for this change in the setier. Since the in-kind 
payments were always specified in setiers themselves, unadjusted figures were appropriate. 
111  For the interpolation procedure, see the notes to appendix 9. 
112 For d'Avenel, see the remarks of Labrousse, Esquisse, 1 : 1 2- 1 5 , especially pp. 1 4 - 1 5. When 
using d'Avenel, I have tried to work with his raw data rather than his averages. Where I had to use 
his averages, I checked the results against other available figures. 
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Baulant, "Prix et salaires"; and d'Avenel, Histoire economiaue, 5:527- 30. For dairy products, I used 
butter prices gleaned from Hauser, Recherches et documents, pp. 1 36-38; Baulant, "Prix et salaires"; 
and El Kordi, Bayeux, pp. 305-306. The sources for eggs were Baulant, "Prix et salaires"; El Kordi, 
Bayeux, p. 228; Hauser, Recherches et documents, pp. 1 40-4 1 ;  Jacques Bottin, Seigneurs et pavsans 
1 1 540- 1650) (Pans, 1 983), annex B; and Leopold Nottin, Recherches sur !es variations des prix dans le Garinais du XV!e au X!Xe siecle (Paris, 1935), p. 1 36. For horses, d'Avenel, Histoire economigue, 
6:455-86; Bertrandy-Lacabane, Bretigny-sur-Orge, p. 33 l ;  and Mantellier, Me moire , pp. 3 1 9-23.  
While some of these prices come from areas other than Paris, the differences turn out to be small, for 
once again the prices were taken from nearby areas such as Normandy and the transport costs for the 
commodities in question were generally low. The effect on the index would be smaller still since the 
product shares for these commodities were all small. 
Sources for the prices in the cost index C were as follows. As is discussed in the text and in 
appendix 7,  wages were the modal wages for unskilled Paris day laborers. The sources were Baulant, 
"Le salaire des ouvriers," and Durand, "Recherches sur !es salaires." As explained in appendix 6, the 
price of seed and feed equaled output prices time 1 plus the interest rate, and prices of capital goods
were rental prices, figured from the sales price via the interest rate and a depreciation rate. Sources 
for the interest and depreciation rates are given in appendix 6. The rental prices of horses, cattle, 
sheep, pigs, and poultry were interpolated from 25-year averages. 
The sales price of equipment was assumed to be proportional to wages, and the sales price of 
horses was the same as the output price given above. The sales prices of cattle, sheep, pigs, and 
poultry were spliced together from 25-year averages. The sources for cattle were Bertrandy­
Lacabane, Bretigny-sur-Orge, p. 333; d'Avenel, Histoire economique, 4:75-94; and Baulant, "Prix et 
salaires." For sheep, Hauser, Recherches et documents, pp. 1 9 1 -92; d'Avenel, Histoire economigue, 
4: I 00- 1 5; and Baulant, "Prix et salaires." For pigs and poultry, d' A venel, Histoire economigue, 4: 1 1 5 -
30, 585, 591 .  Again, low transportation costs and small factor weights justified using some prices 
outsi e aris. 
Most of the explanatory variables in the regressions were derived using prices and information 
in the leases and associated property descriptions. The sources for the others are as follows. The 
index of per-capita taxation (t.) for the years after 1 560 was calculated using decennial averages 
based on population figures and central treasury receipts from Table I of Philip T. Hoffman, "Fiscal
Crises, Liberty and Representative Government: The Case of Early Modern France," (forthcoming). 
For the period before 1 560, I spliced the series of central treasury figures to taille levels given in J.
J .  Clamageran, Histoire de l'impOt en France, 3 vols. (Paris, 1 867-76) and used population figures in 
Jacques Dupaquier et al, Histoire de la population francaise, 4 vols. (Paris, 1 988), 1 : 5 1 3-24, 2:5 1 -68, 
interpolated and adjusted for changes in  frontiers. A local tax series would have been preferable to 
the central treasury and taille figures, but a suitable series does not exist. 
Soil quality was derived from information in Jacques Dupuis, Carte pedologigue de la France 
(Paris, 1 967). For the population of Paris, I relied upon a variety of sources, including Jean-Noel
Biraben and Alain Blum, "Population Trends in France, 1 500- 1 800: Comparison with other Countries,' 
(unpublished manuscript); Marcel Lachiver, 'L'approvisionment de Paris en viande au XVIl!e siecle,' 
in La France d'ancjen regime: Eludes reunies en l'honneur de Pierre Goubert, 2 vols. (Paris, 1 984), 
1 :345-54; Dupaquier, Histoire de la population francaise; E. Charlot and J. Dupaquier, "Mouvement
annuel de la population de Paris de 1 670 a 1 82 1  ,' A nnales de demographie historigue ( 1 967), pp. 5 1 1 -
1 9; and a data base put together by Philip Benedict. The destruction of records makes estimating the 
population of Paris difficult, but Benedict has assembled what seem to be the most reliable estimates. 
In "Was the Eighteenth Century an Era of Urbanization in France,' Journal of Interdisciplinary 
Historv 2 1 ( 1 990): 1 79-2 1 5, he faults the accuracy of the Paris population figures in the Histoire de la 
population francaise, and I have therefore given preference to his numbers and to those in the articles
by Biraben, Charlot, and Lachiver. 
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